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ARTICLES
INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND
THE ESSENCE OF DUTY
ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN∗
“[Did you consider] yourself to have a duty to
act in the best interests of your clients?”
“I believe we have a duty to serve our clients well.”
—Exchange between Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Daniel
1
Sparks, Head of Goldman Sachs’ Mortgage Department
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INTRODUCTION
The political theater surrounding the recently settled enforcement
2
action against Goldman Sachs & Co. has punctuated the ongoing
debate about the legal and professional obligations of financial intermediaries when recommending transactions in financial products—specifically, investment products that shift the risks and split
3
the return of an underlying asset across the marketplace. Recent
4
crises involving investors in auction-rate municipal securities and

2. On July 15, 2010, Goldman, Sachs & Co. agreed to pay the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a $550 million penalty, the largest ever paid by a Wall
Street firm, to settle charges that it misled investors as to the process by which a reference portfolio of subprime residential mortgage backed securities was selected in
marketing a synthetic collateralized debt obligation. Notably, Goldman Sachs acknowledged in its settlement papers that “the marketing materials for the ABACUS
2007-AC1 transaction contained incomplete information” and agreed to undertake
remedial action to prevent future violations, including a “comprehensive, firm-wide
review of its business standards.” Litigation Release No. 21592, SEC, Goldman Sachs
to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage
CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2010/lr21592.htm [hereinafter Goldman Litigation Release].
3. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (defining an “investment transaction” for these purposes). For purposes of this article, transactions designed to
achieve particular tax objectives or seek preferential classification for regulatory purposes are not “investment transactions.” Cf. Interagency Statement of Sounds Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured Finance Activities, Exchange Act
Release No. 53773, 71 Fed. Reg. 28326, 28332–34 (May 16, 2006) (identifying and
reviewing elevated risk complex structured financial transactions).
4. On May 31, 2006, fifteen broker-dealer firms consented to the entry of a
cease-and-desist order and agreed to pay more than $13 million in penalties in connection with alleged violations of federal securities law resulting from the marketing
of “auction-rate securities” (i.e., municipal bonds, corporate bonds, and preferred
stocks with variable interest rates or dividends periodically set by auction). The SEC
alleged that the firms had failed to adequately disclose certain practices to investors
in connection with the conduct of the required auctions, the effect of which was to
conceal the liquidity and credit risks of such securities and to favor certain customers
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5

mortgage-backed securities have further demonstrated the destabilizing effects that poorly designed or unsuitable investment transactions
can have on the financial markets as a whole. Congress has recently
taken a number of steps to address this crisis of confidence in investment recommendations and the quality of regulation in the financial
services sector generally in the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street
6
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
Unlike other areas of financial regulation, such as financial responsibility, where Congress sought more aggressively to harmonize regu7
latory treatment across financial services providers, the legislative reforms respecting investment recommendations continue to cling to
the historic distinctions among “securities,” “derivatives,” “consumer
finance,” and “banking” products. For example, Congress has
8
granted the SEC authority to promulgate rules imposing a uniform,
9
fiduciary standard of conduct on broker-dealers and investment advisers when “providing personalized investment advice and recom10
mendations about securities to retail customers.” In the realm of
over-the-counter derivatives, by contrast, the SEC and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) may only require swap dealand issuers at the expense of others. Bear, Stearns & Co., Securities Act Release
No. 8684, 88 SEC Docket 259, 261–63 (May 31, 2006).
5. A confluence of factors has been identified as contributing to the ongoing
foreclosure crisis in the U.S. housing market, including the demand for high-yield
mortgage-backed securities, the profitability of securitization, the laxity of underwriting practices in subprime and Alt-A mortgage lending, and the development and
marketing of exotic mortgage products with latent risks (e.g., adjustable rates, negative amortization). See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, 40 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-94,
50–52 (2009) (summarizing relevant hearings).
6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
7. See, e.g., S. Rep. 111-176 at 1348–50 (discussing the Act’s consolidation of orderly liquidation authority over both bank and nonbank financial companies).
8. Id. § 913(g)(1), at 1828 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1)) (providing
that the SEC may promulgate rules to provide that the standard of conduct for a
broker-dealer that provides personalized investment advice about securities to a retail
customer “shall be the same as the standard of conduct applicable to an investment
adviser”). Section 913(g)(1) specifically extends this authority to “such other customers as the Commission may by rule provide.”
9. Id. § 913(g)(2), at 1828 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (authorizing
the SEC to promulgate rules providing that “the standard of conduct for all brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers, when providing personalized investment advice
about securities to retail customers . . . shall be to act in the best interest of the customer without regard to the financial or other interest”). Section 913(g)(2) specifically extends this authority to “such other customers as the Commission may by rule
provide.” Id. Congress has also required the SEC to harmonize enforcement of violations of that standard of conduct under the Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act. Id. § 913(h), at 1829 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(m), 80b-11(i).
10. For this purpose, the Act defines a “retail customer” to mean “natural person” or legal representative thereof who “receives personalized investment advice
about securities from a broker or dealer or investment adviser” and “uses such advice
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 913(a), at 1824 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
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ers to provide certain material disclosures to their institutional “counterparties” and to “communicate in a fair and balanced manner
11
based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.”
Consider further the regime governing investment recommendations with respect to traditional banking products. In the realm of
consumer finance, the Act consolidates rulemaking authority over
12
consumer financial products and services, including mortgages, in a
13
new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. While the scope of
14
the Bureau’s supervisory activities is broad, the Bureau’s authority is
15
subject to oversight by other financial regulators and largely circumscribed to compelling disclosure of the risks and benefits of consum-

11. Id. § 731, at 1708 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (authorizing CFTC to adopt
rules for swap dealers to ensure counterparties comply with eligibility standards, to
disclose material risks and material conflicts of interests, and to provide daily marks
on request); Id. § 764, at 1790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8) (establishing the
same authority for the SEC).
12. The Act defines a covered “financial product or service” to include, among
other financial activities: extending credit and servicing loans; extending or brokering leases functionally equivalent to purchase finance arrangements; engaging in deposit-taking activities; and providing financial advisory services to consumers on individual financial matters or in relation to proprietary financial products or services.
Id. § 1002(15)(A)(i)–(ii), (iv), (viii), at 1957–59 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
13. See id. tit. X, at 1955 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); id.
§ 1101(a), at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5491) (establishing “in the Federal
Reserve System[] an independent bureau” to “regulate the offering and provision of
consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws”).
14. Id. § 1022, at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512) (authority to promulgate regulations and issue orders and interpretive guidance). The Act provides for
the transfer of the consumer financial protection functions of the Federal Reserve
Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to the new Bureau, as well as certain functions of the Federal Trade Commission under “enumerated consumer laws.”
Id. § 1061, at 2037 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5581). The Bureau also has the authority to impose registration requirements on persons not otherwise subject to prudential regulation, and to supervise nondepository institutions that originate, broker,
or service certain consumer loans. Id. § 1024(b)(1), at 1987 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5514) (authorizing the Bureau to require reports and conduct examinations on enumerated nondepository covered persons defined by the Bureau to assess
compliance, obtain information about activities and compliance systems and procedures, and to detect and assess risks to consumers and markets).
15. The autonomy of the Bureau was hotly contested in the negotiations over the
final bill; although the Dodd-Frank Act does not create the Bureau as a separate
agency, as set forth in H.R. 4173, which passed in the House of Representatives, the
ability of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to review or intervene in any matters before the Bureau is limited. Id. § 1012(c), at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (describing autonomy of the Bureau). However, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), on which the Federal Reserve Board has one
seat, has the power to review and set aside final regulations of the Bureau if they
would put “the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at risk.” Id. § 1023(a), at 1985 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C § 5513).
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er financial products and services and taking enforcement action to
prevent “unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices,” as narrowly
17
defined in the statute. At the same time, in light of abuses in the
origination of residential mortgages, the Act imposes a nebulous “du18
ty or care” on loan originators requiring them, subject to certain
safe harbors, to make a reasonable and good faith determination that
19
the consumer is reasonably able to repay the loan.
As these open-ended and disjointed initiatives suggest, delimiting
the legal and professional duty of the various categories of financial
intermediaries in providing advice with respect to investment transactions is a topic that policymakers have both exhaustively debated and
20
yet unsatisfactorily addressed. On the one hand, financial intermediaries cannot perform the essential risk-spreading function of markets if investors can effectively exercise an option to “put” back the

16. Id. § 1032, at 2006–07 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5532) (authorizing the
Bureau to prescribe rules and model disclosures to ensure that the features of any
consumer financial product or service are “fully, accurately and effectively disclosed .
. . in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks”).
17. Id. § 1031(a), at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). The Act also authorizes the Bureau to prescribe rules that identify “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts
or practices” in connection with transactions for or the offering of consumer financial protects or services as unlawful, as well as to adopt prophylactic rules to prevent
such acts or practices. Id. § 1031(b), at 2005–06 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
To declare an act or practice “unfair,” the Bureau must have a “reasonable basis” for
concluding that it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is
not reasonably avoidable” or “outweighed countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.” Id. § 1031(c), at 2006 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). To declare
an act or practice “abusive,” the Act requires the Bureau to find that a practice “materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition”
or takes unreasonable advantage” of a consumer’s lack of understanding, inability to
protect self-interest, or reasonable reliance. Id. § 1031(d), at 2006 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5531).
18. Id. § 1402, at 2139 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b).
19. Id. § 1411, at 2142 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c) (requiring creditors,
prior to making a residential mortgage loan, to make a reasonable and good faith
determination based on verified and documented information about income and
assets that a consumer is reasonably able to repay the loan and all applicable taxes,
insurance, and assessments). The Act also creates a safe harbor for “qualified mortgages,” see id. § 1412 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c); infra text accompanying notes
266–268, and prohibits mortgage originators from steering customers away from
“qualified mortgages,” or steering customers to mortgage loans that cannot reasonably be paid or that have predatory characteristics or effects. Id. § 1403 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1639b); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(e).
20. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701 (2010) (discussing the historically different ways in
which fiduciary duties have or have not been imposed on broker-dealers and investment advisers and the need for reform); Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries,
71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 451–52 (2010) (exploring the difficulty of defining the scope
of reform if the SEC seeks convergence of the fiduciary duties of broker-dealers and
investment advisers); Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Applying
Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 837–38 (2009).
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risk of investment products through the threat of litigation. On the
other hand, as financial innovation increases in complexity and investors take on greater responsibility for their financial security, the profession, if not the law, must intervene to ensure that the end-users of
such products are not disadvantaged by the imbalance in information
and sophistication between financial services providers and their cus22
tomers.
Commentators have long catalogued the traditional templates within which the obligations of financial services providers may be
23
judged. As discussed in much greater detail below, fiduciary relationships between financial services providers and clients who repose
their trust and confidence in them create sweeping duties of loyalty
and care enforceable in law and equity. Professional obligations
defined and enforced by industry representatives, such as the obligation to ensure that products and transactions are “suitable” or “appropriate” for a client based on its individual needs, may provide collateral benefits for such clients through public enforcement and in
some cases private litigation or arbitration. Likewise, tailored disclosures and prohibitions against fraudulent, unfair, or deceptive practices may provide investors with additional grounds for relief beyond
those available in the common law of contract or tort. As adaptable
as these concepts are, courts continue to grapple with their application to discrete disputes, while regulators take conflicting positions as
to which template best fits certain products or categories of financial
intermediary.
What is remarkable about the Act’s various mandates, however, is
the subtle attempt to conform the standards that traditional securities
brokers and dealers, security and non-security based swap dealers,
mortgage originators, and other financial services providers must observe when recommending or structuring transactions for retail customers. Whether such a convergence will actually occur depends in
large part on how such standards are characterized. For example,
21. See, e.g., Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers:
The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 464 (caricaturing the “greedy old lady”
posing as the “sweet trusting widow” in order to rescind a transaction with her “faithless (wealthy) broker”).
22. James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and
Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 112 (1998) (understanding retirement planning); Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor—
Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 365 (1995).
23. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail
Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2332 (1996) (laying out
the “core substantive aspects” of “efforts to ‘improve’ sales practices” developed by
commentators).
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while the SEC staff has echoed the recommendation of those commentators who have argued that a fiduciary duty should govern investment advice given by brokers and dealers (as it governs invest25
ment advisers today), the staff has provided little guidance as to
what concrete steps may be taken to harmonize sales practices without requiring broker-dealers to make significant changes to their
26
operations. Moreover, the CFTC and bank regulators would likely
object to any such fiduciary standard that applied to over-the-counter
derivatives, mortgages, and other financial products that have tradi27
tionally been viewed as arm’s-length agreements.
Because a uniform standard of sales practices across all financial
services would improve investor understanding and facilitate investor
decision-making, this Article advocates that securities regulators
eschew attempts to establish a chimerical fiduciary duty that would
apply only to broker-dealers and investment advisers, and instead opt
to work with the CFTC, bank regulators, and other federal and state
financial regulators to adopt a uniform approach to defining the
obligations of financial services providers when making investment
recommendations. The CFTC and bank regulators, in response,
should heed the admonitions of the Dodd-Frank Act and work with
the SEC to develop standards that capture the essence of the fiduciary obligation, even as they might rightly continue to object to the
liability of banks and other credit market participants as fiduciaries.
What form would such a standard take? This Article presumes that
the essence of a financial services provider’s duty—regardless of how
24. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS 107–111 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011
/913studyfinal.pdf (presenting findings on standards of conduct for investment advisers and broker-dealers as required by section 913(b)–(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act)
[hereinafter SEC REPORT].
25. See, e.g., Matthew P. Allen, A Lesson From History, Roosevelt to Obama—
The Evolution of Broker-Dealer Regulation: From Self-Regulation, Arbitration, and Suitability
to Federal Regulation, Litigation, and Fiduciary Duty, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1
(2010) (outlining regulation of broker-dealers from before to after Dodd-Frank);
Ronald J. Columbo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 829,
864 (2010) (suggesting Dodd-Frank did not go far enough because it only required a
study to determine the need for fiduciary duty); Laby, supra note 20, at 703–04 (arguing for uniform fiduciary standard because financial advice is no longer incidental
to the brokerage industry, but an integral part of industry practice); Cody Vitello,
The Wall Street Reform Act Of 2010 and What It Means for Joe & Jane Consumer, 23 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 99 (2010) (urging reform under the Dodd-Frank Act).
26. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 111.
27. Eric C. Seitz, U.S. Subprime Crisis: H.R. 3915—A Far-Sighted Solution to the Mortgage Crisis, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 759, 771–74 (2008) (arguing the suitability doctrine
goes too far); Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry in
Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 407, 414 (2007) (same); Susan Wachter, Price Revelation and
Efficient Mortgage Markets, 82 TEX. L. REV. 413, 414–16 (2003) (finding a suitability
standard would cause instability in credit markets).
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it is constituted or regulated—is to have an ongoing, honest discussion with the customer about each investment decision. More specifically, a discussion focused on a specific measure of risk—for example, the financial services provider’s own estimate of the cost of
hedging the transaction at certain intervals—will focus the customer’s
attention to the risk of the proposed transaction and comparable
transaction with a view to prompting a broader discussion of the customer’s financial goals and needs. Customers must be allowed to
take (and financial services providers must be allowed to recommend) financial risks, but only if the customer receives complete,
adequate, and comprehensible information from the financial services provider about its assessment of the risks and rewards of a transaction. If financial intermediaries are to be permitted (or required) to
act as principals in investment transactions, of course, full disclosure
of their proprietary holdings, trading, and valuation models is not
realistic; financial intermediaries can nevertheless structure a dialogue about investment decisions with their clients in a manner that
promotes the communication of relevant information to the customer and thereby enables the intermediary to discharge its obligations.
Part I of this Article considers the basic policy rationales that underlie the development of sales practice or business conduct rules for
recommending investment transactions. Part II considers existing legal approaches to regulating such recommendations under securities,
commodities, banking, and insurance law. Part III summarizes the
difficulties in extending a fiduciary standard to the various kinds of
financial products marketed today. Part IV surveys various proposals
to improve the process by which financial intermediaries make investment recommendations, and Part V offers a proposal for a uniform sales practice rule for financial services providers when recommending such transactions.
I.

WHY WE REGULATE INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Policymakers tend to treat investment transactions differently from
commercial transactions (where communications with counterparties
are governed by principles of common law contract and tort) and
consumer transactions (where communications with consumers are
subject to prohibitions against “unfair and deceptive acts or practic28
es”). Commentators both for and against greater regulation in this
28. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION:
FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING
79–81 (2004); Hu, supra note 23, at 2343.

DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE ESSENCE OF DUTY

6/5/2011 4:17 PM

1273

area have struggled to identify whether the solicitation of investment
transactions is affected with such imbalances in information, sophistication, and ability to absorb risk, or is rife with conflicts of interest so
prevalent and pervasive, that they should be governed by a unique set
29
of rules and standards instead of the morals of the marketplace.
For purposes of this discussion, the scope of the term “investment
transactions” or “investment recommendations” is intended to include not only transactions involving traditional investment products,
such as stocks, bonds, shares in mutual and exchange-traded funds,
and structured notes, but also transactions involving mortgaged
property, derivatives, and other products that entail capital at risk
and an expectation of profit, whether marketed by banks, insurance
30
companies, or other financial services providers. It is also important
to stress the difference between investment products and investment
transactions: An otherwise suitable product may be sold in an unsuitable transaction (for example, if the markup or commission is exces31
sive or the terms of financing are unconscionable). The manner in
which a transaction is designed, moreover, may significantly affect a
32
customer’s decision to invest in a given product.

29. But see Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets
Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 193 (2009) (suggesting that market pressure resulting from the rescission of or default on mortgages held by special purpose vehicles
may improve underwriting standards for mortgages and hence improve customer
protection).
30. Some commentators correctly note that hedging transactions should not be
deemed investments per se, as they are predominantly used to eliminate or reduce
the risk of fluctuation in interest rates, currency exchange rates, or market prices in
connection with routine operating transactions. George J. Sotos & Kevin F. Bowen,
Commodities Regulation—The Proposed Suitability Standards for the Commodity Industry:
Right Church, Wrong Pew, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 303 (1976) (arguing that hedging
is not investing). To the extent that derivatives trading is dominated by contracts on
individual securities or financial indices, which are combined with securities and
other instruments to adjusted portfolios or to create synthetic investment (such as in
various exchange traded funds, collateralized debt obligations, and structured financial products), there is a strong case for subjecting them to the same regulatory
regime as other investment products. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR
A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 106–109 (2008), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf (describing the rise of financial futures and the corresponding need for convergence
between securities and futures regulation) [hereinafter “TREASURY BLUEPRINT”].
31. Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271,
1277 (1995); Mundheim, supra note 21, at 448–54. See generally Norman S. Poser,
Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001
BYU L. REV. 1493, 1527–69.
32. See, e.g., Goldman Litigation Release, supra note 2 (suggesting that the failure
to disclose the passive nature of the collateral manager’s role in selecting securities
for a synthetic CDO was a material misstatement).
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A. Limiting Assumption of Risk
To the extent that investment transactions are about shifting risk to
the investor, whether from the intermediary, an issuer, or a third party, the mere risk that a customer may lose all or part of its investment
cannot, in and of itself, be sufficient justification for imposing liability
33
on a financial intermediary.
Sales practice rules, for example,
should not generally be thought of as an “insurance policy” against
unfulfilled customer expectations, absent some additional policy jus34
tification for imposing liability on the firm.
Nevertheless, some
commentators have postulated that there should be substantive limits
on the amount of risk firms should allow their customers to bear even
in unsolicited transactions, on the theory that firms have a duty to
35
prevent customers from “gambling” or committing “economic sui36
cide.” The suggestion appears to be that some level of risk is substantively so untenable, based on the type of investment or the size of
37
the transaction, that firms have a duty to intervene.
Certainly, in transactions where the investor is required to make a
38
stream of payments over a period of time, there is a strong legal and
reputational interest in limiting the customer’s exposure to risk.
Firms that extend credit to customers as principals, whether in the
context of financing transactions or derivative transactions, have an
interest in ensuring that the customer is able to satisfy any obligations
it undertakes. For example, the NYSE’s “know-your-customer” rule,
the precursor to the suitability doctrine, reflected the exchange’s
concern about protecting firms against customers’ fraudulent conduct
39
or inability to perform. Likewise, the Office of the Comptroller of

33. Hu, supra note 23, at 2357; Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 59–62 (2008).
34. Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(warning against allowing a civil penalty to amount to an “insurance policy”).
35. See generally Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, With a Tulip, in the South Seas:
Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225 (2001);
Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995).
36. Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (noting that brokers have no continuing duty to keep investors
informed of developments which could affect the value of their portfolios) aff’d, 647
F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); Powers, 344 F. Supp. at 433.
37. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and Risk in
Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 499 (2003) (arguing for securities brokers’ duty
to review, monitor, stop trading).
38. Such payments could take a variety of forms: mortgage payments, interest
payments on margin loans, net payments under swap agreements, variation margin
for options, futures, and other derivatives cleared through a clearinghouse.
39. Sotos & Bowen, supra note 30, at 301.
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the Currency’s (OCC) “appropriateness” doctrine for national banks
entering into derivatives reflected the OCC’s concern that firms
might suffer credit or reputational risk if counterparties were unable
40
to make the required payments.
On a macroeconomic level, an argument could be made that the
law should impose some limits on the assumption of risk in investment transactions because the financial system is unable to bear the
41
shock of mass defaults and ensuing litigation. Commentators have
noted the externalities wrought by the recent financial boom and
42
bust: blight from foreclosures resulting from predatory lending, dis43
tortions in market demand for credit, and a disproportionate im44
pact on poor minorities without history of access to credit markets.
To the extent, moreover, that there are proposals to replace public
funding of retirement and health care programs with self-directed
private accounts, such proposals must take into account the strain
placed on welfare programs by widespread declines in the value of re45
tirees’ investments. On the other hand, sales practice rules may not
be the most appropriate vehicle for deterring such losses, to the extent that that financial services providers are likely to be under equal
stress during such periods and may not be able to absorb the shock of
such events without government assistance.
B. Least Cost Avoidance
A second set of policy justifications for imposing sales practice rules
on financial intermediaries is based on the proposition that financial
40. Jason M. Rosenthal, Incorporation May Not Mean Sophistication: Should There Be
a Suitability Requirement for Banks Selling Derivatives to Corporations?, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1249, 1259 (1996).
41. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. MDL-1446,
2011 WL 43421, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2011) (dismissing allegations of materially
misleading statements with regards to assets deposited into a special purpose entity
and offered to investors); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 08
Civ. 10841, 2010 WL 4903619, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2010) (discussing whether
plaintiffs’ claims of untrue statements of materials facts with regard to loans deposited into a special purpose entity were properly dismissed).
42. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002).
43. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 63–64.
44. Id. at 64–69; Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts
Approach in Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29–36 & n.105 (2009)
(suggesting a “growing awareness that a disproportionate share of subprime loans,
particularly those in the latter years of the subprime mortgage market’s heyday, were
marketed and sold to African-American and Latino borrowers” and summarizing
cases alleging that lenders violated civil rights laws by steering minorities into subprime and predatory loans).
45. Fanto, supra note 22, at 112 (understanding retirement planning); Karmel,
supra note 31, at 909; Markham, supra note 22, at 365.
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services providers have better information, or at least better access to
information, necessary to make informed investment decisions and,
thus, are better able to avoid the foreseeable losses resulting from in46
vestment transactions.
For example, commentators have argued
47
that securities and other financial products are “credence” goods,
the value of which often turns largely on information available to issuers or sponsors—such as the quality of management, estimates of
future earnings, or the value of underlying assets. To the extent that
48
investors are unable to discount for such asymmetry, firms should, at
a minimum, be obligated to provide information in the first instance.
Moreover, to the extent that all financial innovation carries latent
risks, it may be reasonable to hold firms responsible for such risks as
49
an incentive for them to perform ongoing diligence.
Asymmetries in access to information between intermediaries and
their clients, of course, vary from transaction to transaction. For
some transactions, such as derivatives or stock funds indexed to currencies, spot prices in commodity markets, or broad-based indices, it
50
is arguable that firms possess no privileged access to information.
Moreover, government agencies, financial firms and sophisticated investors devote extensive resources to basic research on property pric-

46. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1335 (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)).
47. Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 82–88 & n.22 (1989) (summarizing the view of
economists that a “security’s value depends upon information, much of which is
about the business and comes directly from the business” and therefore that “the
value of securities is substantially dependent upon the ability of the business issuing
the securities to supply the firm-specific information to the buyers”).
48. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
49. Jennifer Bethel & Allen Ferrel, Policy Issues Raised by Structured Products, in
NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS:
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY
CHALLENGES 167, 173–74 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (noting the
recent rise in sales of structured products to retail investors, and the current regime
in place to protect such investors); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a
Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2039 n.1
(2007).
50. See, e.g., LAWRENCE HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 314–315 (2003) (observing that, to the extent informational asymmetries contribute to wider spreads,
“[s]preads in contracts that represent economywide risks” will be “quite small” because “[t]raders rarely have significant material information” about such conditions
and “information about local supply and demand conditions” generally does not
have a “material effect” on the whole market; making similar observations about “diversified portfolios” to the extent that “information about individual assets” “rarely is
material” to all assets in the portfolio); see also Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 337 F. Supp. 107, 112 (D.C. Ala. 1971) (noting that a “broker has
no duty to relay news of political, economic, weather or price changes to his
principal”)
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es, default and prepayment rates on mortgages, economic forecasting, agricultural cycles, and so forth with a view to divining how such
51
transactions will perform. In other cases, markets operate without
an adequate opportunity for investors to perform diligence, and in
effect, force reliance on the firm’s integrity in finding or structuring
52
the investment transaction.
When the variables contributing to the value of an investment
transaction are within the intermediary’s control or at least subject to
its influence, the case for holding intermediaries liable may be
stronger. For example, in some transactions, the firm retains the
right to amend the terms of the transaction unilaterally (e.g., the
right to call or increase the interest rate on margin loans), or assumes
responsibility for the determination of critical obligations under the
transaction (e.g., collateral payments based on the fair value of the
53
transaction). In others, the transaction may be effected in reliance
on continued willingness of the firm, the issuer, or the sponsor to
54
maintain a secondary market in the investment product or, in the
absence of a secondary market, to provide an opportunity to unwind
55
the transaction on reasonable terms. While sales practice rules typi56
cally look to the firm’s conduct at the time of the transaction, one
can question whether heightened duties at the outset are an appropriate way to encourage both full disclosure and faithful conduct
throughout the life of the investment.

51. HARRIS, supra note 50, at 314 (noting that “many governments have agencies
that collect and publish information on market conditions” in order “[t]o reduce
information asymmetries”); DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT
BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY: THE NEW PARADIGM 119–122 (2010) (noting that the research provided by large investment banks “usually covers equity, fixed
income, currency, and commodity markets”).
52. Engel & McCoy, supra note 49, at 2060, 2068 (noting that institutional investors often lack the opportunity to perform adequate due diligence with subprime
mortgage pools and instead rely on credit entities whose interests are not aligned).
53. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 9 (discussing credit card interestrate adjustments).
54. See, e.g., Bear, Stearns & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8684, 88 SEC Docket
259, 260 & n.3 (May 31, 2006) (noting Bear Stearns’ facilitation of a secondary market in auction-rate securities in which customers could make transactions based on
the underlying par value).
55. Bethel & Ferrel, supra note 49, at 22.
56. Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing on S. 3217 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (Testimony of John C. Coffee,
Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) [hereinafter
Coffee Testimony].
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C. Imbalances in Actual or Perceived Sophistication
Another common policy justification for enhanced sales practice
rules for investment transactions is the imbalance in sophistication
between financial firms and their customers, whether real or perceived. The expansion of homeownership, defined contribution
plans, and individual retirement planning means that more households engage in investment transactions, but basic financial literacy,
in the view of some commentators, has not kept up with these
57
trends. Similarly, even relatively sophisticated institutional investors
58
or corporations may not rationally be able to devote sufficient resources to mastering the terms of financial transactions designed by
59
specialized teams within major commercial or investment banks. As
a result, policymakers debate whether regulation should paternalistically correct for such imbalances by shifting some of the responsibility for decision-making to financial intermediaries, or whether regulators should focus on warning investors of risks and prompting them
60
to educate themselves.
57. See, e.g., Allison De Tal, Knowledge Is Power: Consumer Education and the Subprime Mortgage Market, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 633, 651 (2008) (noting the lack of financial
literacy leading to the subprime mortgage problems and arguing for a financial
counseling requirement for purchases of mortgages with certain characteristics);
Fanto, supra note 22, at 107–08 (“Saving and investing are critical for survival in our
society . . . . Because investing has assumed a significance in their lives that it did not
generally have for their parents, they must be educated in how to invest.”); Henry T.
C. Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and the Public Corporation
Model, 60 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1307–08 (2005) (“The inevitable long-run cutbacks in Social Security and Medicare benefits further emphasize the need for all Americans to
have some at least minimally acceptable framework for evaluating investment risks
and returns.”); see also Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 197, 200 (2008) (arguing that widespread investor education is not plausible).
58. Professor Choi, among others, has advocated a certification regime, in which
investors would hold themselves out as possessing (or be evaluated to determine
whether they possess) the sophistication necessary to participate in investment transactions; concomitantly, firms would be relieved of ethical obligations (but presumably not liability for affirmative misstatements) to such customers. Stephen J. Choi,
Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 280
(2000). This philosophy is recognized, to a certain degree, in the CFTC’s disclosurebased approach to suitability and the NASD’s interpretive memorandum regarding
suitability obligations to institutional investors. See infra note 156.
59. Hu, supra note 23, at 2356; Poser, supra note 31, at 1517–19; Rosenthal, supra
note 30, at 1255 (firms may have pricing models superior to those of the corporate
end-users). Moreover, to the extent that institutional investors necessarily act
through human agents, commentators have also noted that such human agents are
often prone to the same cognitive biases as investors acting for their own account.
See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1511 (2002) (collecting evidence
that contends market professionals are subject to the same biases as other investors).
60. Black & Gross, supra note 37, at 483–85; Fanto, supra note 22, at 118–26
(arguing that “[c]onstraints in American culture,” such as the “preference for individual responsibility and decision-making” and the “longstanding ‘Main Street’ hos-
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In recent years, scholars following the field of behavioral economics have argued that sales practice regulation should also take into ac61
count the cognitive biases that impair rational decision making.
Even investors with a working knowledge of financial concepts expected of the “reasonable investor”—such as the time value of money,
62
the relationship between risk and return, or simple financial
63
fraud —may be susceptible to sales pitches that exploit basic cogni64
tive limitations or psychological vulnerabilities. Some scholars have
suggested that firms use detailed information about how consumers’
expected use of financial products deviates from their actual use
tility to, suspicion of, and yet irresistible attraction to the dominant market capitalism
typified by Wall Street,” compel an approach in which individuals take responsibility
for their own savings and investment decisions but demand education to help “correct the ‘educational’ asymmetry between ordinary investors and Wall Street”),; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities: An
Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 586 (2005); David Reiss,
Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending To Flourish in the
Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1004 (2006).
61. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627,
635 (1996); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 358–78 (analyzing behavioral factors such
as rational ignorance, optimism, biases, and probabilities).
62. Fanto, supra note 22, at 132 (“A consumer must comprehend elementary
finance to be able to think about investing from a financial perspective. An investor
should understand the time value of money, investment return and risks, liquidity,
and the relationship of risk to return”); Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as
They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1037
(2002) (observing that courts expect reasonable investors appreciate to the time value of money, the relationship of return to risk, how brokers are compensated, and
the importance of diversification).
63. Fanto, supra note 22, at 135 (suggesting that investors “should learn the basic
features and rationale of the kinds of investment fraud that they are most likely to
encounter”); See also Jayne W. Barnard, Deception, Decisions, and Investor Education, 17
ELDER L.J. 201, 226–35 (2009) (addressing the use of investor education to combat
deceptive investment practices); Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The
Case for Replacing “the Reasonable Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in
Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 476–480, 486 (2006) (observing that the “reasonable investor” standard for assessing materiality assumes the ability to see through
simple frauds—”schemes promising, for example, a forty-four percent return in
twelve days or a $500,000 return from a $3000 investment”—which unsophisticated
investors trading in an inefficient market without the benefit of an adviser [“underclass investors”] may lack).
64. See Langevoort, supra note 61, at 635; Prentice, supra note 61, at 358–78. Affinity fraud—which the SEC defines as “scams that prey upon members of identifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, or professional
groups—poses such risks even for the most successful investors. See U.S. Securities
and Exchange Comm’n, Affinity Fraud: How to Avoid Investment Scams that Target
Groups, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm (last updated Sept. 6, 2006);
see also Douglas M. Branson, Trekking Toward Über Regulation: Prospects for Meaningful
Change at SEC Enforcement?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 545, 563 & n. 78 (2010); Heather Hiznay, How the Bernard Madoff Scandal Exposed Weakness in Asset Management Regulation,
28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 413, 414 (2009); Christine Hurt, Evil Has A New Name (and
a New Narrative): Bernard Madoff, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 958 (2009).
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(e.g., credit cards) and design products that take advantage of such
65
deviations. Likewise, to the extent that firms are able to tailor financial products to the needs of an investor (whether at the time of
the transaction or while the transaction is outstanding), firms may be
able to discriminate between those investors who actively negotiate
the standard terms in their transactions and those who seek to freeride off the monitoring costs of others but are unaware of the better
66
deals available to those who ask.
Naturally, regulation might be particularly appropriate when firms
create a perceived asymmetry of sophistication in order to market
their financial services. At the time the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was enacted, for example, securities and insurance brokers were
commonly perceived to be professionals subject to professional duties
67
of care. In a complementary vein, bankers have traditionally been
viewed as conservative lenders who have designed financial products
with a view to ensuring, at a minimum, that extensions of credit are
adequately secured and that the borrower has the means to make
68
timely payments of interest and principal. Minimum standards of
professional competence certainly may be set through examination
and qualification requirements for sales representatives and other associated persons of a financial services provider. But when firms hold
69
themselves out as providing “investment advice,” advertising “supe70
71
rior skill,” encouraging “trust,” or otherwise engage customers in
65. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 70 (describing patterns of credit card
use).
66. Id. at 9.
67. Gerald L. Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers—The NASD Suitability
Rule, 51 MINN. L. REV. 233, 246 (1967) (noting an increased affiliation between
NASD and securities firms); Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers
and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 400, 408 (2010); Richard J. Wirth, My
Customer’s Keeper: The Search for a Universal Suitability Standard in the Sale of Life Insurance, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 47, 78 (2002); see Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 527, 548, 554–58 (2002) (arguing that Congress intended to regulate brokerage
and dealing by elevating professional standards and thereby facilitating malpractice
claims under state law).
68. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1272 (describing the Stiglitz-Weiss model of
monopoly on credit historically used to restrict mortgage loans to all but most creditworthy borrowers).
69. Laby, supra note 67, at 413–17 (arguing that the broker-dealer exclusion from
the definition of “investment adviser” in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) should be lost if
a broker-dealer markets itself or otherwise holds itself out as an “adviser” in light of
the connotation of the word).
70. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 4, at 694 (1st
Sess. 1963) [hereinafter SEC SPECIAL STUDY] (“intricate merchandise”); Mundheim,
supra note 21, at 450; Stuart D. Root, Suitability—The Sophisticated Investor—And
Modern Portfolio Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287, 337 (1991).
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one-on-one discussions about their financial needs and goals, it is
debatable whether the risk of reputational harm is sufficient to en72
courage financial services providers to deal honestly with customers.
D. Conflicts of Interest
Investors also are not necessarily able to appreciate, or adequately
discount for, the many conflicts of interest to which financial services
providers and their associated persons are subject. The simplest of
these is compensation: To the extent that firms or sales representatives are compensated on the basis of the number, size, or profitability of the individual transactions they consummate, they have an incentive to push customers to execute more, larger, and more
73
lucrative transactions. By contrast, when service firms or sales representatives are compensated based on the size of the portfolio they
oversee, there is a risk that they will adopt management strategies
that allow them to devote increasingly less attention to individual
74
transactions or customers. To the extent that these compensation
71. DEBORAH DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP (1991).
72. Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of United States Securities Regulation: An Essay
on Regulation in an Age of Technological Uncertainty, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 83, 105 (2001)
(describing brokers as “gatekeepers” who could be liable for inappropriate trading
on behalf of customers). See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Haas, Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted
Over the Internet: Are They “Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 95
(1989) (discussing the hesitance of investment banks to underwrite small issuer public offerings for reputational concerns).
73. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1492–94 (1993) (contemplating problems with the principal/agent relationship when swap traders are
compensated by bonuses); Laby, supra note 67, at 406–07 (discussing the Tully-Levitt
report on brokers’ transaction based compensation); Langevoort, supra note 61, at
662 (positing that brokers’ quotas might spur selling that they would otherwise have
reservations about); Poser, supra note 31, at 1524; see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(i)(VI)
(excluding “banks” from the definition of “broker” in connection with certain third
party arrangements as long as “bank employees do not receive incentive compensation for any brokerage transaction” other than nominal compensation “unless such
employees are associated persons of a broker or dealer”); id.
§ 78c(a)(4)(B)(ii)(excluding “banks” from the definition of “broker” in connection
with certain trust activities provided, inter alia, that the bank “is chiefly compensated
for such transactions, consistent with fiduciary principles and standards, on the basis
of an administration or annual fee . . . , a percentage of assets under management, or
a flat or capped per order processing fee”). Similar practices occur in the mortgage
finance market. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1263 (bonus for loan flipping encourages flipping); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 31 (pushing subprime mortgages to customers who qualify for prime mortgages). The Dodd-Frank
Act prohibits the payment to or receipt by a mortgage originator of any “compensation that varies based on the terms of the loan (other than the amount of the principal).” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1403, 124 Stat. 1376, 2139 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b).
74. George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of Interprofessional Frontier Skirmishing: Financial Planning Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75, 106 (2007); Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers—What’s in a
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structures mimic compensation structures in other consumer markets, the question becomes whether customers can make informed
decisions about the frequency, size, or type of transactions best suited
to their needs despite those conflicts.
The nature of financial services, however, entails a much more
complex and opaque web of relationships among service providers.
Since the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (and even before), commercial banks have offered a variety of banking, securities,
75
derivatives, and insurance services under a single umbrella. Investment banks and other securities firms, likewise, provide a range of
underwriting, market making, derivatives, research, and advisory
76
business under one roof. Even independent insurance companies,
mutual fund companies, mortgage brokers, and other financial services firms enter into a variety of arrangements with other financial
77
firms for the marketing and distribution of their products. As a result, commentators focus the debate on the extent to which sales
practice regulation is necessary to prevent firms from charging excessive fees or steering customers to inferior products offered by their
78
affiliates or business partners.
At a minimum, the transparency of such fees and relationships is
important to ensuring that the market is able to discount for potential conflicts of interest; some commentators have argued that competition may be sufficient, for example in the mutual fund industry,
79
to ensure that fees are fairly set. Others argue that mere disclosure
and competition are insufficient to protect investors, particularly if
Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 45 (2005); Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators
Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 528 (2007); D. Bruce
Johnsen, Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights on Jones v. Harris, 35 J.
CORP. L. 561, 568 (2010) (discussing SEC rulemaking efforts with respect to IAs and
the fees they charge mutual funds).
75. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 215, 219–22 (describing the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and
the decades of Federal Reserve Board regulatory action that preceded it).
76. LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS 140 (2003) (defining “investment banks” as “[b]rokerage firms that
engage in large capital transactions,” such as block trading, underwritings, and
mergers and acquisitions).
77. Wilmarth, supra note 75, at 428–34.
78. See, e.g., Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 87–88
(2010) (discussing commentary regarding a “suitability” requirement for brokerdealer recommendations).
79. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 74, at 584 (arguing that mutual fund management fees are set competitively).
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customers are reliant on their brokers or financial advisers to guide
them in the process of selecting particular transactions from a range
80
of potential options. More extreme approaches to addressing these
concerns might include a heightened duty to sanitize certain con81
flicts, such as through regulatory exemptions, or outright segrega82
tion of proprietary trading and public customer business.
II. THE REGULATORY TAXONOMY TODAY
The extension of heightened sales practice standards to a broader
range of financial transactions is simultaneously enticing and unnerving. Even if recent events have proven the existing paradigms for regulating investment transactions ineffectual, the difficulty lies not only in adapting the depth and scope of the fiduciary standard to the
specific transactions that recur in customer disputes, but also in tailoring remedies that appropriately balance the multiple roles that
commercial and investment banks, brokerage firms, insurance companies, and other financial intermediaries play.
Take, for example, the concept of the financial intermediary as
“fiduciary.” Borrowed from the law of trust and agency, the term refers to the highest obligation of the agent to act loyally for the prin83
cipal’s benefit. The concept of fiduciary duty is sufficiently elastic in
its depth and scope that it has been invoked in the context of simple
securities transactions with individual investors as well as complex derivatives transactions between investment banks and institutional in84
vestors. And yet, the concept of a fiduciary, if extended to financial
80. See, e.g., Steven J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003) (“For behavioralists, the single-minded focus of the SEC
on disclosure presents a puzzle. We doubt that disclosure is the optimal regulatory
strategy if most investors suffer from cognitive biases.”); Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 10
(2010) (criticizing the “soft” disclosure mandated by Section 406 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002).
81. See William P. Wade & Richard I. Loebl, Individual Prohibited Transaction Exemptions: The “Common Law”, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185, 191–99 (1994) (describing the Department of Labor’s source of authority and process in issuing “prohibited transaction exemptions” under ERISA).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 204–10 (discussing the pros and cons of
segregation).
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). The formulation “best interest” was introduced into fiduciary law to supplant the notion that a fiduciary acts in
the “sole interest” of the party to whom the duty is owed, in part to reflect that conflicts of interest may exist. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 150 (2011).
84. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 190–92 (1963)
(finding congressional intent to apply fiduciary standard to investment advisers); In
re Daisy Sys. Corp., 97 F.3d 1171, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding investment bank
owed fiduciary duty to client in structuring merger); Baker v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
656 F. Supp. 2d 226, 237 (D. Mass. 2009) (holding the dismissal of a claim of breach
of fiduciary duty against investment adviser in all-stock merger as inappropriate);
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services providers with respect to all investment recommendations,
would force a dramatic, and not necessarily salutary, reconfiguration
of the multiple roles that securities brokers and dealers play in the
financial marketplace.
Other commentators have focused on extending the “suitability”
requirement, long a staple of the law governing broker-dealers, to
apply to ethically problematic conduct by purveyors of mortgage
85
products and other financial services providers. One of the difficulties, for example, in proscribing predatory practices in the mortgage
lending market is the uniqueness of each borrower, the property to
be mortgaged, and the expected duration of the loan. Some scholars
have often advocated that “suitability” obligations for financial services providers that originate or underwrite mortgages—particularly
when such mortgages are bundled and fed to securities markets
through the process of securitization—are more appropriate than the
required “truth-in-lending” disclosures or prohibitions against
86
narrowly defined “unfair and deceptive” lending practices. And yet
federal bank regulators and credit rating agencies have resisted such
initiatives, even after the collapse of the subprime lending market, in
part out of the fear (however ironic) that stringent consumer financial protection laws might jeopardize the safety and soundness of the
originating banks and the integrity of the market for mortgage87
backed securities.
The continued effectiveness of disclosure and antifraud rules in
the context of both securities transactions and other consumer
finance transactions is also routinely questioned. Commentators
have noted the mixed record of courts in granting equitable relief in
disputes over inadequate disclosures in mortgage finance and the
88
marketing of other banking products. In the context of securities
transactions, courts presiding over private litigation of brokercustomer disputes have likewise undertaken a steady campaign over
Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953–54 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (holding that a broker owes no fiduciary duty unless transactions are
discretionary or the broker has de facto control), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981);
Stokes v. Henson, 265 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding investment adviser owed individual clients fiduciary duty in providing investment advice).
85. See Macey et al., supra note 20, at 790–91, 837–38 (arguing that the application of the suitability requirement might have stopped homeowners from obtaining
subprime mortgages); Wirth, supra note 67, at 47–48, 81–85 (analyzing the application of suitability requirement to insurance contracts).
86. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1317–63 (2002) (arguing for the
application of the duty of suitability to the subprime mortgage market).
87. See supra note 27 (making the case against applying the suitability doctrine).
88. See infra text accompanying note 146–149.
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the past several decades to shift the burden onto aggrieved investors
to establish defendants’ consciousness of wrongdoing and a right to
89
rely on the defendants’ representations as a predicate to recovery.
However justifiable it may be, the rigorous burden-shifting with respect to scienter and reliance in suits between financial services providers and their customers weakens incentives for securities brokers
to engage customers in a forthright discussion of the risks and rewards of particular investments, particularly when compulsory arbitration of securities disputes eliminates any transparency in how this
90
body of law is applied.
The following three sections examine the fiduciary standard as
currently applied to investment advisers and in other contexts, with a
view to contrasting it with the suitability doctrine and the use of affirmative disclosures.
A. The Fiduciary Standard
The scope and depth of fiduciary duties holds the greatest promise
for ensuring that providers of financial services act in the best interests of their clients, even as the imposition of duties of loyalty and
care on all investment transactions poses a variety of theoretical and
practical problems. The duty of loyalty in general “requires that the
agent subordinate the agent’s interests to those of the principal and
place the principal’s interests first as to matters connected with the
agency relationship,” although such arrangements may be modified
91
by mutual agreement. The duty of loyalty thus subjects arrangements such as dual agency or self-dealing to heightened scrutiny to
ensure that the principal’s interests are not subordinated to that of
92
the agent or another. The duty of care has traditionally required fiduciaries to manage the affairs of the principal with the “care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances,” taking into account any “[s]pecial skills or knowledge
93
possessed by [the] agent.”
In the context of financial services, clear examples of relationships
consistent with fiduciary obligations include custodial services or asset
management: When the custodian or manager has discretionary
authority over investment, duties of loyalty and care are necessary to
89. See infra text accompanying notes 155–156.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 150–154, and 176–181.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006).
92. rdWILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 67–68, at 140–
144 (3 ed. 2001) (describing the duties of an agent when transacting with the principal or as a dual agent).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006).
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protect the interests of beneficial owners who may otherwise have limited legal power to direct the manner in which funds are invested
or that fees are set for such services. Both the Investment Advisers
Act and state law generally recognize that a person who manages the
94
funds of others is a fiduciary. The SEC staff’s report notes that
91.2% of accounts managed by investment advisers registered with
the SEC confer some discretionary authority on the investment advis95
er.
Courts have also found that securities or insurance brokers may
have fiduciary duties when they recommend transactions to customers, for example, when customers have reposed such “trust and confidence” in the broker that the broker exercises de facto discretionary
96
authority over the management of the customer’s account. By and
large, however, brokers and other transactional agents are subject to
fiduciary duties under common law only to the extent that they execute specific tasks as agents for the account of and subject to the di97
rection of the principal, such as placing orders, executing, clearing,
and settling transactions, and holding customer funds or securities.
Fiduciary duties appeal to those commentators who doubt the efficacy of ex ante regulation through rules or principles-based ongoing
94. See Beacon Hill CBO II, Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC, 249 F. Supp. 2d
268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 17 (1979) (applying federal law); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963) (applying federal law); Lowenbraun v. Rothschild,
685 F. Supp. 336, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying New York law); Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co., 310 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (applying New York law)) (relying on both the Investment Advisers Act and New York law) , aff’d on other grounds, 89
F. App’x 749, 750 (2d Cir. 2004).
95. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 6–7. The remaining 8.8 percent of accounts
are nondiscretionary in nature. Id.
96. See, e.g., Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951,
953–54 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (recognizing a fiduciary duty for brokers handling a discretionary account), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2006) (asserting that a fiduciary relationship between
broker and customer “most commonly . . . exists in situations in which a broker has
discretionary authority over the customer’s account”); Trumball Invs., Ltd. I v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 436 F.3d 443, 445–46 (4th Cir. 2006) (comparing nondiscretionary and discretionary investment accounts); Romano v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty because customer exerted control over his nondiscretionary account);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Heritage Capital Advisory Servs., Ltd., 823
F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no fiduciary duty for a broker operating a
nondiscretionary account).
97. See Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d 933
(2d Cir. 1998); see also De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d
Cir. 2002) (noting that for nondiscretionary accounts, a broker only owes a customer
a fiduciary duty “[o]n a transaction-by-transaction basis”). See generally Langevoort,
supra note 61, at 676, 677 n.150 (analyzing how the scope of relationship is determined when a customer is sophisticated but opts to rely).
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98

supervision. Ex ante rulemaking in the financial industry, as scholars routinely note, may be efficient when regulators are able readily
to accumulate information about the types of abuses frequently perpetrated by issuers, sellers, and sponsors of financial products and to
develop succinct disclosures or procedures that can check their
99
recurrence; ex ante rules perform less well when malefactors easily
circumvent each new iteration of rules or when the burdens of disclo100
sure deter new entrants or the provision of new services. While ongoing supervision under a principles-based regime may be appropri101
ate for safety and soundness regulation, it would be extraordinarily
complicated to extend that model to ongoing supervision of clients’
investment accounts for the purpose of identifying exposure to exces102
sive investment risk.

98. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 102–04 (contrasting “principles-based” investment adviser regulation with “rules-based” broker-dealer regulation); John C. Coffee,
Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L.
REV. 707, 757–58 (2009) (criticizing the “rules/principles continuum”). But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1492 (2007)
(speculating that the phenomenon of “global rhetoric championing principles-based
systems” is “due to a combination of a regulatory desire to provide a counterweight
to demand for rules, a quest to rejuvenate ethics, and a desire to distinguish a jurisdiction’s legal-financial products” and arguing that if it is “infeasible to establish a
principles-based system of corporate law, securities regulation, or accounting, then it
is misleading to promote the possibility”).
99. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 74 (noting the greater ability of regulatory agencies, as opposed to courts, to distinguish fees in credit contracts that
represent “liquidated damages” and punitive fees that are unenforceable).
100. See Langevoort, supra note 61, at 673–74 (describing the costs of regulatory
intervention). As discussed below, regulators have prescribed voluminous disclosures in connection with individual securities, financing transactions, and other financial products, and yet the cumulative effect of these disclosures is not only to
overload the capability of the investor to make a rational decision but also to shield
the offering firm from liability if sufficient meaningful cautionary disclosures have
been made. See infra text accompanying note 129.
101. See, e.g., Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,021, 67,022 (Dec. 19, 1996) (describing the “internal rating system used by the Federal supervisory agencies and State supervisory agencies for evaluating the soundness of financial institutions on a uniform
basis and for identifying those institutions requiring special supervisory attention or
concern”).
102. Of course, regulators may conduct periodic inspections of firms to target
specific risks, such as scams targeting the elderly or particularly vulnerable segments
of the population. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1941 (2010) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5537) (requiring the CFPB’s Office of Financial Literacy to establish a
program to make grants available to states or state securities commissions, insurance
commissions, and consumer protection agencies to protect senior citizens from certain misleading designations or misleading or fraudulent marketing with respect to
advising or servicing individuals over the age of sixty-two); David Adam Friedman,
Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 45, 73–74 (2007) (examining the
practice of random hyper-protection for certain groups). In addition, regulators re-
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The power of fiduciary duties has also traditionally lain in the
sweeping equitable relief that courts may employ not only to compensate principals for harm suffered as a breach of duty, but also to
103
deter misconduct even in the absence of harm to the principal.
Thus, for example, a breach of the duty of loyalty might require not
only that the agent compensate the principal for any harm suffered
as a result of self-dealing, but also require the agent to disgorge to the
principal any “secret profits” or other financial benefit obtained as a
104
result of the breach.
The severity of these remedies traditionally
has been explained as a tool for punishing or deterring disloyalty by
the agent, or more recently, as a means of placing the onus on the
agent to obtain the principal’s informed consent prior to affecting
105
mutually beneficial transactions. In this respect, the fiduciary duty
performs a suppletive role—filling in terms most friendly to the principal in the absence of specifically negotiated terms between the
agent and the principal.
Fiduciary duties are also notable for the willingness of courts to disregard contractual arrangements when they have reason to suspect
that the fiduciary is not acting with the principal at arm’s length.
Congress has imposed a fiduciary duty on advisers to mutual funds,
pension funds, or other collective investment funds, even when they
purport to contract at arm’s length with fund representatives, to the
extent that such funds that lend themselves to exploitation by the fi106
nancial services provider.
Similarly, financial services providers
quire conversations and customer complaints to be preserved as evidence in subsequent investigations. See, e.g., NASD Rule 3110(d),
FINRA
Manual
(CCH)
17,360,
at
17,361
(2009),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=
3734 (requiring record of customer “complaints”).
103. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1056–61
(2007) (describing “[t]he ‘substantial factor’ standard for loss causation . . . as a
‘prophylactic rule intended to remove all incentive to breach’”); D. Gordon Smith,
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1493–97 (2002)
(arguing that the availability of restitution, and specifically disgorgement, is necessary for a beneficiary to be able to control a fiduciary). But see discussion infra Part
III.A (noting that clients of an investment adviser have no private right of action
against the investment adviser for breach of the fiduciary duty created by section 206
of the Investment Advisers Act).
104. FRANKEL, supra note 83, at 254–56; see, e.g., Coburn v. Warner, 110 F. Supp.
850, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (concerning secret commission); O’Malley v. Boris, 742
A.2d 845, 847 (Del. 1999) (requiring disclosure of broker’s receipt of ownership interest in exchange for transfer of customer accounts under Delaware law).
105. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 83, at 101–02 (identifying morality, punishment,
and self-protection by entrusting parties as mechanisms that limit misconduct by fiduciaries).
106. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (defining who is a “fiduciary” under
ERISA); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a)(authorizing the SEC to bring an action for “breach of
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contracting with corporate representatives may be held responsible
for transactions effected by corporate employees who exceed their
107
In some cases, clearing broauthority or violate internal controls.
kers have been held responsible for breaches of fiduciary duty by introducing brokers on whose behalf the clearing brokers carry securities accounts, on the theory that the clearing broker had a duty to
108
monitor such accounts.
Whether the concept of the fiduciary can be extended to other
areas of financial sales practice regulation is debatable, as discussed
in Parts III and IV below. Many investment transactions offered by
financial services providers possess the characteristics of arm’s-length
transactions: Dealer sales from inventory, extensions of credit under
a mortgage or margin loan, and tailored derivatives contracts all in109
volve an arm’s-length relationship.
Moreover, fiduciary standards,
particularly to the extent they encompass a duty of care, have nevertheless typically been associated with investment professionals with de
110
jure or de facto discretion to trade on behalf of client accounts.
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment
company for which such person so serves or acts,” inter alia, “as officer, director,
member of any ... investment adviser”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731, 124 Stat. 1376, 1703, 1708–09
(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (imposing a duty on swap dealers “to act in the best
interests” of, and “make reasonable efforts” to obtain such information as is necessary to carry out that duty to, an advisory client that is a federal, state, or municipal
agency, an employee benefit plan or governmental plan under ERISA, or an endowment); id. § 764, at 1784, 1790–91 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8) (amending section 15F(h)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by imposing the same
duty on security-based swap dealers).
107. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906, 917 (W. Va.
1995) (holding that whether Morgan had knowingly aided and abetted a violation by
state employees of a state statute barring the use of state funds for “speculation” was a
question for the jury); see also Langevoort, supra note 61, at 697–99 (intimating that
such a doctrine could become “something of a loose cannon” imposing a duty on
brokers to refrain from a transaction anytime an institutional buyer seems to be acting inconsistently with an objective standard of the institution’s needs); Markham,
supra note 22, at 365 (describing Drexel’s liability in CFTC proceeding); Rosenthal,
supra note 40, at 1264 (“[I]t was not the absence of regulation that led to . . . large
derivatives losses, but rather the continuing absence of internal corporate controls . .
. .”).
108. Black & Gross, supra note 62, at 1042.
109. See, e.g., Grant E. Buerstetta, Creating a Flexible Fiduciary Duty Rule for Banks Entering into Proprietary Derivatives Contracts, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 395, 403–08 (1996)
(distinguishing the bank-to-depositor relationship, where traditionally there is no
fiduciary duty, from the bank-to-customer relationship in which investment products
are sold).
110. Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083,
1090–96 (2007) (arguing that a fiduciary duty should not be imposed on analysts, in
part because “analysts do not exercise discretionary authority over the property of
their institutional and issuer clients”); Karmel, supra note 31, at 1273 (asserting that a
firm that “exercises actual or de facto control over a customer’s account because of a
customer’s trust and confidence . . . may owe a fiduciary obligation to the custom-
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For example, it is difficult to hold a fiduciary liable for the failure to
take care in making investment recommendations, unless it has the
authority to manage the client’s entire portfolio—and thus assume
overall responsibility for appropriate allocation of investments and
111
diversification.
B. Disclosure-Based Approaches
A second approach to characterizing the relationship between a financial services provider and its client is an arm’s-length transaction,
subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as augmented by enumerated affirmative disclosures (or implied representations) about the quality of the investment and the terms governing
the transaction. At a minimum, this approach would prohibit firms
from making material misstatements about the character of a transac112
tion. Thus, for products such as swap transactions among sophisticated parties, which have not historically been subject to federal securities law or other product-specific disclosure obligations, litigants
have relied upon common law concepts of contract or fraud to estab113
lish a right to relief. For many products, however, federal or state
law requires the disclosure of extensive additional information to cus114
tomers prior to or at the time the transaction is consummated.
115
Such disclosures can serve multiple purposes. In addition to addressing the imbalance of information between the financial services
provider and the customer, disclosures necessarily disrupt the selling

er[,]” and citing older cases referring to “unfair dealing”); see Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Certain Brokers and Dealers, Securities Act Release No.
15215, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 640, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,176, 47,177 (Oct.
13, 1978) (interpreting the Investment Advisers Act exclusion for broker-dealers as
not applying to broker-dealers who “almost exclusively” manage discretionary accounts).
111. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1) (2010) (describing the duty of a fiduciary to an employee benefit plan); Jerry W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security, 38
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 747, 796–98 (2001) (discussing evolution of prudent man rule and
DOL standards for portfolio management); Wirth, supra note 67, at 78–79 (discussing insurance producers).
112. See Hu, supra note 23, at 2326–28 (explaining the “no-lying” category).
113. See S. Lawrence Polk & Bryan M. Ward, A Guide to the “Regulatory No Man’s
Land” of Over-The-Counter Interest Rate Swaps, 124 BANKING L.J. 397, 402–04 (2007)
(discussing the legal regime governing swap transactions).
114. See, e.g., Joseph U. Schorer, The Credit Card Act of 2009: Credit Card Reform and
the Uneasy Case for Disclosure, 127 BANKING L.J. 924, 937–38 (2010) (describing, among
other things, the new federal law’s mandate of more explicit disclosure to credit card
users about the long-term cost of making only minimum payments).
115. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 23, at 2321–22 (noting that disclosure “facilitate[s]
information gathering and reduce[s] errors stemming from rational or irrational decisions to forego information”).
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process and give the customer an opportunity to consider more care116
fully the terms of the transaction: In an era where signing on the
dotted line has been replaced by electronic records of oral consent,
the delay between sales pitch and confirmation has all but disappeared. The effectiveness of disclosure at upending the sales pitch
depends upon timing; in some contexts, law and regulation require
significant ex ante disclosure of the terms, or require firms to offer
clients a “cooling off” period during which a transaction may be res117
cinded.
Similarly, for some products, disclosure must be made
concurrently with each individual transaction consummated, whereas
for others, a “blanket” disclosure governing all subsequent transactions is sufficient to relieve the service provider of any continuing ob118
ligation.
Disclosure regimes are much more common in financial services,
in part because of the relative ease with which regulators can standardize what information needs to be disclosed and the relative certainty they provide the financial services industry (not to mention
bank supervisors who view liability as a risk to safety and soundness)
as to what their statutory or regulatory obligations are. To illustrate,
the issuance of mortgages or home equity lines of credit is governed
by elaborate disclosures under rules promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board for banking institutions and by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) for non-bank originators pursuant to statutes such as
119
the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement Pro120
cedures Act (“RESPA”), and the Home Ownership and Equity Pro116. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 693.
117. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1187–88 (2003) (describing legally-mandated
“cooling-off periods for [certain] consumer decisions” as examples of “libertarian
paternalism”). Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8(b) (2010) (requiring delivery of preliminary prospectus to any person who is expected to receive a confirmation of sale
in a public offering of securities by a nonreporting issuer at least 48 hours prior to
the sending of such confirmation), with 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2006) (prohibiting
the carriage of any security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale in connection with a registered offering, unless accompanied or preceded by a statutory
prospectus under section 10(a) of the Securities Act).
118. See Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, [2005 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,051, at 76,978, 76,988 n.13, 76,989 (Aug. 31,
2005) (granting no-action relief permitting the use of blanket global consents for
certain principal transactions but noting the Commission’s position that “[b]lanket
disclosure and consent, rather than transaction-by-transaction consent, generally will
not suffice because of the potential for self-dealing that can be associated with each
principal transaction”); see also Black, supra note 74, at 38–39 (“The disclosure must
include the facts necessary to alert the client to the adviser’s potential conflict of interest; it is not sufficient for the investment adviser merely to provide a blanket disclosure and general consent.”)
119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67f.
120. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17 (2006).
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121

tection Act (“HOEPA”).
Special disclosure rules exist for the
122
marketing of contracts sold on futures exchanges and options
123
124
exchanges, and for transactions in penny stock, variable annui125
ties, and other specialty products. And of course, federal securities
law imposes extensive affirmative disclosures governing both primary
offerings of and secondary markets in individual securities and mu126
tual funds, in addition to catch-all liability for securities fraud under
127
section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 under the
128
Exchange Act.
One pervasive critique of disclosure regimes is that they tend over
time to inundate investors with information. Several commentators
have echoed concerns that securities and other regulatory disclosures
129
have reached the cognitive limits of the individual investor. Inves121. 15 U.S.C. § 1639; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1305–09 (describing disclosure requirements under TILA, RESPA, and HOEPA).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (2010) (requiring the distribution of “Risk Disclosure Statement” by futures commission merchants and introducing brokers); see also Protection
of Commodity Customers; Risk Disclosure by Futures Commission Merchants to Customers, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,723, 52,723–25 (Nov. 23, 1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(proposing an amendment to section 1.55 of the 17 C.F.R. to clarify that risk disclosure statement is not exhaustive of a futures commission merchant’s duty to disclose
all material information to customers under applicable state law); Sotos & Bowen,
supra note 30, at 306 (explaining the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on
Commodity Futures Trading Professionals that new commodity futures customers
should be given a risk disclosure statement).
123. FINRA Rule 2360, FINRA Manual (CCH) 4137, at 4142 (2009) (governing
options), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6306.
124. Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15g-9(a) (2010); see also Langevoort, supra note 61, at 687 (outlining the substance and timing of required disclosure for penny stock transactions).
125. FINRA Rule 2330, FINRA Manual (CCH) 4133-2 (2009), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=12069&
element_id=8824&highlight=2330#r12069 (governing purchases and exchanges of
deferred variable annuities).
126. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1961, 1968–70 (2010) (describing the SEC’s disclosure requirements for mutual
funds).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
129. See Black & Gross, supra note 37, at 485 (“[D]isclosure requirements have become increasingly complex . . . .”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 305 (1986) (arguing that it is normal and reasonable for “consumers who are faced with the dense text of form contracts” to “respond by refusing
to read”); Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 802–06 (2007) (analyzing disclosure regulations under the First Amendment); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload
and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (voicing concern about “information overload” in securities regulation); A. C. Pritchard, The SEC
at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1087–89 (2005) (criticizing
the SEC’s “[f]ixation” on disclosure); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (arguing that “disclo-
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tors who do not perceive that the benefits of digesting required
disclosures exceed the potential costs may simply ignore such materials out of rational apathy, or assume that they can free-ride off of
130
the diligence of other investors receiving such information. Regulators may regularly attempt to redefine what is material to permit a
131
greater degree of abstraction, or to simplify disclosures so that
persons of a specific reading level and sophistication can compre132
hend the material terms. Such simplification comes at a cost, however, since reliance on abstract categories or classifications (for
example, in the naming of products) can create incentives for finan133
cial services providers to game the system.
Disclosure requirements also do not necessarily provide informa134
tion to the consumer that is of practical use. To the extent that we
sure can be insufficient to remedy the information asymmetry between the originator
and its investors”).
130. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 278–79 (2003) (addressing rational apathy in terms of shareholder governance); Nathan Knutt, Note, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 503–
04 (2005) (addressing both rational apathy and the free rider problem); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1171 (1981) (explaining rational apathy and
its relation to the free rider problem).
131. Fanto, supra note 22, at 171–78 (discussing the SEC’s initiatives to modify
mutual fund disclosure formats to improve comparability of firm disclosures).
132. Cf. id. at 164–171 (discussing the SEC’s “plain English” initiative and the tension between communicating complex information to sophisticated investors and
educating the least sophisticated investor); Elizabeth C. Yen, Mortgage Loan Disclosure
and Other Pre-closing Regulatory Requirements: Do They Fulfill Their Intended Consumer Protection Purposos? 124 BANKING L.J. 131, 132–33 (discussing reading level for credit
card disclosures); see also John Beshears et al., How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals’ Mutual Fund Choices? 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14859, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14859 (finding no evidence
that the SEC’s simplified summary prospectus for mutual funds affects investors’
choice of portfolio).
133. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010) (providing rules governing “money market” mutual funds); Investment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund
Names and Marketing, Securities Act Release No. 9126, Exchange Act Release No.
62300, Investment Company Act Release No. 29301, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920 (June 23,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 270) (proposing rules relating to retirement funds that include a “target date” in their name); In re Civil and Military Investors Mutual Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 2723, 38 S.E.C. 451,
458–59 (June 9, 1958) (declaring company’s name to be deceptive and misleading,
in violation of section 35(d) of Investment Company Act of 1940, as implying, among
other things, that company’s investment program was particularly suited to meet investment needs of government personnel).
134. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 23, at 2373–74 (critiquing the usefulness of certain
historical data on investment returns); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2377 (1998) (“Researchers
found no stock price effect when firms disclosed the newly mandated replacement
cost information, suggesting that investors did not find the SEC’s mandated disclosure useful for valuing firms.”); see also Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure
as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1129 (2007) (concluding that a suc-
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might expect investors to rely on the firm’s own representations as to
the risk of a particular transaction, qualitative disclosures about possible risk factors, expressed through the copious use of modal verbs,
135
are not helpful in making an informed judgment. For example, a
disclosure that market makers may not support a product in the future, or that interest rates may rise in connection with an adjustablerate mortgage, convey no information about the firm’s assessment of
those risks. As such, it may be difficult for the ordinary investor to
discount for such risks when making an investment decision. On the
other hand, commentators rightly note that sophisticated customers
136
can negotiate for such information and the disclosure of the firm’s
own analysis of the merits of a transaction might inappropriately lead
137
investors to believe that they are entitled to certain returns.
Moreover, as several commentators have suggested, disclosures
about the merits of an individual product or transaction may not be
138
helpful absent references to comparable products.
To demonstrate, the need for disclosure of comparable products is frequently
invoked in the context of marketing subprime mortgage products to
139
borrowers qualifying for prime mortgages, or in the context of
excessive fees charged by actively managed funds versus passively ma140
naged index funds.
Disclosures about comparable products, how141
ever, could conceivably raise issues of freedom of speech if firms are
compelled to make disclosures that contravene their own judgment
cessful disclosure system must articulate why the information sought “will be useful to
an underlying regulatory goal and why it is not currently available”).
135. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 61, at 692 (advocating disclosure of the
“probability”—not just the “possibility”—of particular risks).
136. Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence From Europe In 1999—Part I, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 685–86 (2001)
(observing the quality of disclosure documents that accompany “International-style
Offerings” to institutional investors in Europe and the due diligence work that underlies this documentation are “of a much higher quality than the formal disclosure
requirements of most, if not all, European countries” because “ ‘the market requires’
the higher level of disclosure” institutions are accustomed to receiving in offerings
under U.S. law).
137. Hu, supra note 23, at 2375.
138. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1280 (noting that “the typical victims of
predatory lenders” are unaware of their options). But see Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,249, at 91,091,
91,097 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (explaining that a broker has no obligation to disclose information about competitors’ products).
139. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1264, 1264 n.20 (discussing “naïve
borrowers” who are tricked into borrowing costlier loans).
140. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 23, at 2359–60 (proposing greater disclosure of quantitative information about performance relative to other instruments).
141. See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 51–61 (1989) (discussing compulsory and prohibited
speech).
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(or their own financial interests) when regulators’ determination of
142
what constitutes comparable products is subject to dispute.
Furthermore, applying disclosure requirements at the time of a
transaction appears to foreclose the possibility that a firm has any
continuing duty to advise the customer as to material information
that may trigger a decision to liquidate the position or to modify the
terms of the transaction. Courts have generally rejected the argument that a pattern of providing ongoing investment advice with respect to customer trading may create a duty to provide complete or
143
updated advice.
It would be even more difficult to conceive of a
requirement that mortgage brokers or bank representatives review
the accounts of mortgagors to determine whether refinancing is appropriate, or for insurance brokers to recommend that customers
144
scale back coverage as their personal circumstances change.
While enforcement actions based on disclosure violations may
generate fines and injunctions to deter future violations, they do not
necessarily compensate aggrieved investors for the entirety of their
145
loss.
Unlike regulations governing pure credit products in which
courts may be willing to protect customers from paying excessive rate
hikes or charges under theories of unconscionability or lack of good
faith, or pursuant to statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts or
146
practices, the typical investor claim involves an asset that may have
147
declined in value through no fault of the financial intermediary.
When disclosure violations committed by a financial intermediary are
discovered after the transaction has been consummated, a court must

142. See, e.g., SEC v. Wall Street Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (“[D]isclosure requirements have been upheld in regulation of commercial
speech even when the government has not shown that ‘absent the required disclosure, [the speech would be false or deceptive] or that the disclosure requirement
serves some substantial government interest other than preventing deception.’”(alteration in original)) .
143. See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir.
2002) (“The giving of advice triggers no ongoing duty to do so.”).
144. See Wirth, supra note 67, at 59 n.42 (noting the New York Insurance Department’s opposition to a proposed duty to suggest amendments to life insurance policies).
145. The Dodd-Frank Act amended the “fair funds” provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act to permit the SEC to direct that civil monetary penalties collected from
parties found in violation of the securities laws be added to a disgorgement fund or
other fund for the benefit of the victims of a violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (as
amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1852 (2010)).
146. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 33, at 71–72 (discussing unconscionability
and penalty defenses).
147. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 628 (characterizing the “mutual finger-pointing
that often occurs in disputes between stockbrokers and their customers” as a “predictable drama in the field of investments”).
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decide not only whether the intermediary should disgorge its revenue
from the transaction, but also whether the intermediary should absorb the full amount of the loss to the customer attributable to the
148
violation.
Courts may be unwilling to impose equitable remedies
such as rescission or restitution, even when expressly authorized by
149
federal or state law, absent egregious circumstances.
To the extent that investment transactions can be expected to fail
routinely, courts may impose a gauntlet of obstacles to avoid undoing
the risk-shifting objectives of the investment transaction based on
150
inaccurate or incomplete disclosure.
For instance, courts may be
151
reluctant to brand novel conduct as deceptive or fraudulent. In the
context of securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act, courts have required plaintiffs to prove the defendant’s
consciousness of the disclosure violation (scienter) and have permitted defendants to use disclosure documents containing cautionary
152
language to defeat plaintiff’s reliance on oral representations.
Courts also focus on the sophistication of the investor in determining
the reasonableness of his right to rely on statements of the broker
153
that conflict with written disclosures, thus ironically shifting the

148. See, e.g., In re Mutual Funds Investment Litig., 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009)
(permitting mutual fund shareholders to bring Rule 10b-5 class action against investment adviser for misrepresentations made in prospectus with respect to “market
timing”), cert. granted sub nom. Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,
130 S. Ct. 3499 (June 28, 2010).
149. For example, courts have imposed obstacles in the face of customers seeking
rescissionary relief under TILA and other mortgage lending disclosure laws. See Robert Murken, Comment, Can’t Get No Satisfaction? Revising How Courts Rescind Home
Equity Loans Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 457, 465 (2004) (describing many courts’ underlying “concern that the statutory scheme would impose inequitably harsh forfeitures on creditors”).
150. See, e.g., Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities
Litigators Need To Know, 62 BUS. LAW. 1281, 1285–87 (2007) (discussing “75 defense
doctrines that courts have used in recent years to dismiss securities claims” at preliminary stages of securities class action litigation, based, inter alia, on the defendant’s
alleged role, the nature and materiality of the disclosure violation, the defendant’s
state of mind, the reasonableness of plaintiff’s reliance, and the relationship between
the violation and loss).
151. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2008–10
(2006); Friedman, supra note 103, at 58–59.
152. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 677, 681 (discussing the right-to-rely and duty
to read).
153. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1028
(4th Cir. 1997) (weighing eight factors to determine institutional investor’s justifiable reliance: the “sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securities matters”; “existence of long standing business or personal relationships”; “access
to relevant information”; “existence of a fiduciary relationship”; “concealment of the
fraud”; “opportunity to detect the fraud”; “whether the plaintiff initiated the stock
transaction or sought to expedite the transaction”; and “generality or specificity of
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focus of inquiry away from the intermediary’s conduct and represen154
tations.
C. Ethical or Professional Obligations
A third approach attempts to stake a middle ground between the
undue paternalism associated with fiduciary duties and the assumption of sophistication and rational decision making associated with
155
disclosure-based approaches.
This approach finds its best expression in the National Association of Securities Dealers’ (“NASD”)
156
Under the rule, firms are generally required to
suitability rule.
“make reasonable efforts to obtain information” regarding a customer’s financial status, tax status, investment objectives, and other information used or considered to be reasonable in making recom157
mendations.
The rule then generally requires member securities
firms making recommendations to a customer to “have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such
customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situa158
tion and needs.”
As a rule of a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), the suitability
requirement is cast as a professional obligation grounded in “just and
159
equitable principles of trade.” Analogous rules appear in the rulebooks of other securities SROs, such as the New York Stock Exthe misrepresentations”); Poser, supra note 31, at 1514–15 (absolute or rebuttable
presumption).
154. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 61, at 684–685 (suggesting that the “principal
role of the duty to read” is to deal with the difficulty of making credibility determinations about a broker’s oral representations to customers at the time of the recommendation and that brokers can “manipulate” the customer’s motivation not to read
by delaying delivery of any required documentation until the “customer’s commitment to the investment is securely anchored”).
155. See generally, Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities
Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1570 (1999) (setting out the two most important
considerations in determining whether a customer is making independent decisions:
the customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk independently and the customer’s exercise of independent judgment in evaluating a broker-dealer’s recommendation); Macey et al., supra note 20, at 815–21 (discussing the doctrine of suitability,
which requires that broker-dealers only recommend to their clients those financial
transactions that are suitable given the customer’s level of financial sophistication,
current investments, financial status, personal circumstances, and so on).
156. NASD Rule 2310, FINRA Manual (CCH) 17,155 (2009), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=
3638.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6) (2006) (“just and equitable principles of
trade”); SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 70, at 309 (describing the NASD’s “suitability”
rule as a specific provision to control violations of this “general ethical standard”).
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change and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.
In the
insurance industry, suitability requirements appear in various state
162
insurance codes as well as in the recommended suitability guidelines of industry bodies such as the National Association of Insurance
163
Commissioners (“NAIC”). Suitability requirements may also reflect
a desire to protect firms from the reputational or credit risk of customer defaults or misconduct, as does the OCC’s appropriateness re164
quirement for derivative transactions effected by national banks.
165
Other regulators have historically disavowed any suitability rule, although courts may imply such duties as part of a financial services
166
provider’s fiduciary duty.
The clear benefit of an industry standard of care is that it focuses
on the firm’s conduct, rather than its motivations or conflicts of interest, in an objectively verifiable way. Firms are thus invited to develop internal guidelines for the risk characteristics of particular investment transactions and to identify the classes of customers to
which they will be offered based on information gathered through
167
questionnaires and other documents submitted by the customer.
In both banking and securities firms, these internal controls can then
be evaluated by examiners—this can be done on an ongoing basis
160. N.Y.S.E. Rule 405(1), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2405, at 3697 (1984), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.
asp?selectednode=chp_1_5_7_6&manual=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F. The
origin of the rule was the self-protection of the broker. Markham, supra note 22, at
369.
161. MSRB Rule G-19, MSRB Manual (CCH) ¶ 3591, at 4891 (2003), available at
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G19.aspx.
162. Wirth, supra note 68, at 56–57 (noting the range of “suitability” tests).
163. THOMAS R. SULLIVAN & ADAM HAMM, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS, SUITABILITY IN ANNUITY TRANSACTIONS MODEL REGULATION (2010),
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_a_suitability
_reg_guidance.pdf; see also Carl B. Wilkerson, When Worlds Collide: Securities Regulation
and Equity Product Distribution by Life Insurance Companies, 26 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC.
L.J. 497, 513 (1991).
164. Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular 277, 1993 Fed Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 58,717, at 36,462 (Oct. 27, 1993); Comptroller of the Currency Bulletin 94–31, 1994 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 58,717, at 36,473 (May 10, 1994); see
also Hu, supra note 23, at 2339.
165. Compare Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed.
Reg. 44742 (Sept. 6, 1977) (proposing several suitability standards), with Adoption of
Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31887 (July 24, 1978) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 166) (declining to adopt a proposed suitability rule, ostensibly on the theory
that suitability is covered by anti-fraud provisions).
166. See e.g., Root, supra note 70, at 321–27 (discussing the judicial imposition of
fiduciary duties, including the obligation to make suitable recommendations, in
commodities cases notwithstanding lack of CFTC guidance).
167. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1329; Jane E. Willis, Banks and Mutual Funds: A Functional Approach to Reform, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 221, 252 (1995).
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through the traditional bank supervisory process for outstanding
loans, derivative contracts on a firm’s balance sheet, or in inspection
sweeps focusing on particular account classifications. For this reason,
a number of commentators have suggested that suitability requirements should be imposed, often through a self-regulatory process, in
168
the context of other financial markets, such as mortgage finance.
Suitability obligations pose a number of problems. First, the obligation of due diligence in assessing a customer’s status and objectives
assumes that customers are entirely forthcoming about their financial
situation. Firms that act as financial planners or advisers to individual
customers might have such holistic information about a client’s objectives, but for customers whose finances are spread out over various
financial professionals, financial services providers can easily argue
that they should not be held responsible for the performance of the
169
entire portfolio. If one accepts the premise that any nonfraudulent
investment transaction can, in proper proportions to the rest of an
170
investor’s portfolio, represent a proper balance of risk and return,
it is difficult to hold firms liable for aggressive recommendations that
go sour under a theory of suitability.
This poses particular problems in the case of institutional investors,
which are naturally reluctant to disclose their financial dealings with
other firms. For example, NASD member firms are exonerated from
their suitability obligations to an institutional customer if the firm assures itself of a “customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk independently” and determines that the customer will “exercis[e] in171
dependent judgment in evaluating a member’s recommendation.”
Nevertheless, some of the most prominent suitability cases under federal and state law have involved institutional investors seeking to
rescind or modify transactions in various derivatives or asset-backed

168. For example, Engel and McCoy suggest suitability as a tool for deterring predatory lending, supra note 42, at 1319, while Macey and his co-authors make an argument that mortgage brokers who originate securities with a view to securitization
are subject to 10b-5, supra note 20, at 807.
169. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Beyond Precedent: Arbitral Extensions
of Securities Law, 57 BUS. LAW. 999, 1008–13 (2002) (suggesting that an arbitration
panel may “have stretched or reached beyond existing legal authorities” in finding a
brokerage firm liable to a customer who was “an experienced and knowledgeable
businessman and stock and options investor [who] devoted a substantial amount of
his time to investments in the securities markets and maintained brokerage accounts
with several brokerage houses.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
170. But see Stephen B. Cohen, Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J.
1604, 1634 (1971) (suggesting that no investment is unsuitable if a portfolio is properly balanced).
171. NASD Rule IM-2310-3, FINRA Manual (CCH) at 17,158.
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securities on the ground that they did not possess the information or
172
sophistication necessary to understand the risks they had assumed.
Second, as an industry standard of care, it is difficult to develop
objective standards of conduct for the amount of risk a customer can
undertake for purposes of determining liability or comparative fault.
Certainly, if a customer cannot take advantage of the unique features
of an investment transaction (e.g., tax benefits) because of his status,
an argument can be made that a more generic transaction might
have been appropriate. Presumably, statutes and rules that govern
deceptive practices can police transactions that are designed to fail or
generate excessive fees. But in cases where the product is arguably
suitable for some investors, objectively scaling the transaction to a
particular investor’s income, net worth, or investment portfolio is
173
inherently arbitrary.
Private litigation over violations of an industry code of conduct may
also create significant uncertainty for both financial services providers
and their clients. Because SRO rules or regulatory requirements are
generally not actionable in themselves, private rights of action are
typically rooted either in breach of a common law duty of care or, in
the context of securities law, breach of an implied representation that
174
brokers will conduct themselves in accordance with industry norms.
172. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997);
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1289–90 (S.D. Ohio
1996); In re BT Sec. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7124, Exchange Act Release
No. 35136, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,477, at 86,109 (Dec. 22, 1994); see Poser,
supra note 31, at 1497 (collecting cases where large institutions and governmental
entities have sued under the suitability doctrine).
173. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan Co., NO. 07-4373-BLS1,
2008 WL 517279 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008). In Fremont, the court held that any
mortgage loan (including loans that were not “high cost mortgage loans” under the
Predatory Home Loan Practices Act) secured by the borrower’s principal dwelling
should be presumed to be structurally unfair “within the penumbra of [the Act’s]
concept of unfairness” if it possessed four characteristics: The loan is an ARM with
an introductory period of three years or less; the loan has an introductory or “teaser”
rate for the initial period that is at least 3 percent lower than the fully indexed rate;
the borrower has a debt-to-income ratio that would have exceeded 50 percent if the
lender’s underwriters had measured the debt, not by the debt due under the teaser
rate, but by the debt due under the fully indexed rate; and the loan-to-value ratio is
100 percent or the loan carries a substantial prepayment penalty or a prepayment
penalty that extends beyond the introductory period. Id. at 9. In response to the argument that such conduct was not generally recognized to be unfair at the time the
loans were made, the Court observed that the meaning of unfairness “is forever
evolving, not only to adapt to changing social, economic, and technological circumstances, but also to reflect what we have learned to be unfair from our experience as a
commonwealth” and that Fremont had more than fair warning of the dangers posed
by the loans bearing the four characteristics identified above. Id. at 12–13.
174. See, e.g., GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Although arguably there is no right of action simply for a violation of NASD rules, .
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Reliance on the antifraud provisions of securities law thus gives rise to
the same burdens of proof (e.g., state of mind) and affirmative defenses (e.g., duty to read, sophistication) that frustrate private litigants in the context of affirmative misstatements or misleading
175
omissions.
In the securities context, the availability of mandatory arbitration
of disputes under the auspices of self-regulatory bodies creates fur176
ther uncertainty, for good or for ill. While commentary on the ef177
fectiveness of arbitral fora in securities disputes has been mixed, it
is arguable that arbitral fora comprised of industry and public representatives might be better suited to resolving customer disputes in an
equitable manner than judicial or administrative fora. Arbitrators are
not required to issue opinions and there is limited opportunity for
178
judicial review; in contrast, judicial procedures, which are bound by
precedent, are subject to appeal, and may entail comparatively more
179
expense.
Both policymakers and academic commentators have
advocated the creation of self-regulatory bodies to promulgate business conduct rules and, in some cases, arbitral fora for sellers of in180
181
vestment advisory, mortgage, and insurance services.
III. THEORETICAL CHALLENGES TO A FIDUCIARY STANDARD
Crises of confidence in the financial system instinctively translate
182
into a desire to ratchet up the duties of financial services providers.
. . violations may be considered relevant for purposes of § 10(b) unsuitability claims.”
(citation omitted)); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980)
(concluding that “there is no implied right of action for an NASD rule violation”); see
also 9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4440-4443 (3d ed. 2004).
175. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 677 (explaining the concept of a customer’s
right to rely); id. at 681 (noting judicial imposition of a duty to read).
176. The Dodd-Frank Act gives the SEC the authority to prohibit or regulate
“agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal
securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws” or SRO rules. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §78o).
177. See generally Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L.
REV. 1174 (2010) (examining the history and criticism of arbitration in arguing that
pre-dispute arbitration agreements should not be banned by Congress).
178. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 156, at 1584, 1594 (noting that ninety-five
percent of “errors and omissions” claims under brokerage firms’ insurance policies
are suitability claims).
179. Black & Gross, supra note 62, at 1013.
180. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1337.
181. Scott A. Sinder, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and State Regulation of the Business of
Insurance—Past, Present and . . . Future?, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 49, 85 (2001).
182. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 423–24 (2006); Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
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To the extent that financial intermediaries are sometimes required to
observe fiduciary duties (e.g., when holding funds or engaging in discretionary trading), it is only natural to assume that such duties may
be extended more broadly to all to financial intermediaries at marginal additional cost. Further, to the extent that conflicts of interest
can result in harm to the client, it is a natural impulse to invoke traditional fiduciary duties of a trustee or agent in an effort to discipline
financial intermediaries.
Yet, as Justice Frankfurter aptly remarked, imposing the doctrine
183
“only begins the analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry.” The
business model that broker-dealers and other financial services
providers employ is not well equipped to deal with the full range of
obligations a true fiduciary duty would entail. For example, investment advisers are subject to significant statutory restrictions when acting as a principal or dual agent in transactions effected for clients
and have a duty to avoid other conflicts of interest when managing
184
discretionary accounts.
Because broker-dealers may often participate as principals in transactions with customers, their fiduciary duty
to nondiscretionary accounts has traditionally been limited to the
faithful execution of customer transactions and the “handling” of
185
customer accounts.
Likewise, because broker-dealers have traditionally been compensated for transactions rather than accounts,
broker-dealer regulation has evolved to address abuses of such
“transaction-based compensation,” such as churning of accounts and
excessive markups.

FIN. 1, 1 (2002) (describing the evolution of securities law as “punctuated” by capital
market events spurring regulation).
183. SEC v. Chenery Corp, 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943).
184. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (prohibiting certain transactions between an
investment adviser as principal and its customer “without disclosing to such client in
writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting
and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction”); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(3)2 (requiring written consent “prospectively authorizing” agency-cross transactions
and a “written confirmation at or before the completion of each such transaction”
describing the nature of the transaction); Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 40, 11 Fed. Reg. 10997 (Feb. 5,
1945) (“In my opinion the requirements of written disclosure and of consent contained in [section 206(3) of the Advisers Act] must be satisfied before the completion of each separate transaction. A blanket disclosure and consent in a general
agreement between investment adviser and client would not suffice.”).
185. De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302–03 (2d Cir.
2002).

DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE ESSENCE OF DUTY

6/5/2011 4:17 PM

1303

Applying the label “fiduciary” more broadly may thus be an exer186
To the extent that
cise in appearances rather than substance.
financial intermediaries not otherwise responsible for discretionary
decision-making have a duty of care, those obligations typically have
been limited to, and are difficult to extend beyond, the traditional
diligence into the character of the transaction and the financial situation and needs of the client. To the extent that it is consistent with
the duty of loyalty to establish procedures to sanitize conflicts, the
question arises whether courts or regulators are better suited to dictating what procedures are sufficient and what remedies are appropriate for the failure to observe. Establishing more permanent information barriers or an ongoing duty to advise could significantly
ratchet up the costs of financial services. Each of these arguments is
considered in turn.
A. Professionalism and Care
A duty of care pervades many aspects of a financial services provider’s relationship with the customer, such as the execution of transactions, the custody of customer funds and securities, recordkeeping
and reporting, and forwarding proxy materials and other important
notices affecting the customer’s portfolio. In addition, regulators
prescribe examinations and qualifications as a condition of registration of such professionals and impose recordkeeping and reporting
requirements to ensure that duties are fulfilled; malfeasance or nonfeasance with respect to any of the foregoing often results in some
187
sanction.
The concept of a duty of care when making investment
recommendations is not only implied (if not explicitly stated) in the
fiduciary duty investment advisers owe to their clients under the In188
vestment Advisers Act, but is also implicit in various mandates for
189
broker-dealers under the Securities Act and the corresponding requirements for secondary transactions developed through SEC en-

186. Cunningham, supra note 98, at 1492 (arguing that if it is “infeasible to establish a principles-based system of corporate law, securities regulation, or accounting,
then it is misleading to promote the possibility”).
187. Even here, one may argue that such standards are designed for the protection of the financial and reputational interests of the financial services industry, rather than customers. Unlike malpractice liability for legal and medical professionals,
the failure to comply with industry custom rarely gives rise to liability by financial services providers to retail clients or counterparties.
188. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92
(1963).
189. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b)–(c), 77l(a)(2) (2006).
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191

forcement actions, the FINRA suitability rule, and the OCC ap192
propriateness policy.
However, beyond the mere performance of due diligence into a security and into the customer’s financial condition and needs, it is unclear how regulators should articulate any additional obligation that a
193
“fiduciary” duty of care requires.
As one commentator has noted,
the fundamental concern with brokerage sales practices is the pros194
If courts
pect of unduly risky or unnecessarily costly transactions.
or regulators are permitted to make hindsight judgments as to relative risk and available alternatives, the cost of providing investment
195
advice could increase dramatically, with a particular impact on
196
smaller firms that may not be able to pass on such costs to clients.
If, on the other hand, investment recommendations are simply “professional judgments” to which courts must defer, the duty of care
would appear to be satisfied as long as a documentary record of dili197
gence can be produced.
Although regulators have developed express quantitative guidelines in certain narrow contexts—e.g., the 5%
198
guide for “excessive” markups under the NASD’s markup policy or

190. See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595 (2d Cir. 1969).
191. NASD Rule 2310, FINRA Manual (CCH) 17,155 (2009), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=
3638.
192. See supra note 164.
193. Professor Ribstein argues that the duty of care of a professional should be
distinguished from “fiduciary” duty, which focuses on relinquishment of gain for services rendered. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties 9 (Ill. Program in Law, Behavior & Soc. Sci., Research Paper No. 10-20, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=1737948.
194. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 444–45.
195. In a study sponsored by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), the Oliver Wyman Group estimated that fee-based accounts under
the Investment Advisers Act are twenty-three to thirty-seven basis points more expensive than retail commission-based accounts and further determined that shifting brokerage customers to a fee-based advisory model would increase costs across the range
of investors. OLIVER WYMAN GROUP, STANDARD OF CARE:
HARMONIZATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR SEC 4, 23–31 (2010), available at
www.sifma.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21999
[hereinafter
OLIVER
WYMAN STUDY].
196. In its Staff Report, the SEC staff noted that, as of December 2010, fifty-three
percent of FINRA broker-dealers employed less than ten registered representatives,
twenty-nine percent employed ten to fifty employees, nine percent employed fiftyone to 150 employees, and nine percent employed over 150 employees. SEC REPORT,
supra note 24, at 11–12.
197. Ramirez, supra note 67, at 550.
198. NASD IM-2440-1 (adopting a “5% Policy” on markups while stressing that the
policy is a “guide, not a rule” and that lesser markups may be “considered unfair or
unreasonable”); NASD IM-2440-2 (stating that markups must be determined based
on “prevailing market price” as determined by the dealer’s “contemporaneous cost”
or “contemporaneous proceeds”).

DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/5/2011 4:17 PM

THE ESSENCE OF DUTY

1305

199

statutory standards for “high-cost” mortgages — courts applying qualitative standards of suitability must struggle with the decision
whether to ground their rulings in empirical evidence demonstrating
200
abnormalities from industry practice.
Developing quantitative standards for suitability, while not infeasi201
ble, poses its own challenges. Any attempt by regulators to require
firms to classify or otherwise grade investment transactions on an objective spectrum of risk, and thereafter to sanction firms that mischaracterize such risk, runs the risk of being counterproductive or, at
worst, treading upon the financial services provider’s ability or willingness to speak candidly about its perceptions of risk. Congress and
the SEC, for example, have generally sought to shield projections,
opinions, or other forward-looking statements about securities from
sanction for fear that such liability could chill the flow of information
202
to potential investors. In the context of securities litigation, credit
rating agencies have invoked the First Amendment with mixed success to defend their right to publish negative ratings about corporate
203
issuers.

199. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 1431–33, 124 Stat. 1376, 2157, 2160–63 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1639).
200. See, e.g., Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999) (criticizing the district court’s finding that a markup on a Treasury security was not “excessive” because it was “indisputably at the extreme low end of what the SEC considers to be acceptable” and because there was “no authority for his contention that ‘the
standard industry spread’ for such a markup is five times less than what the defendants charged” for not engaging in a “more extensive examination”);
Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smoth v. Arceneaux, 767 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting
judicial rule of thumb that an annual turnover rate in excess of six reflects excessive
trading”).
201. Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification and Using Spread to
Measure Risk, 54 BUS. LAW. 1599, 1626 (1999) (advocating use of the bid/ask spread
as a quantitative measure of risk for purposes of determining whether an otherwise
adequately diversified portfolio recommended to an investor poses unsuitably excessive risk).
202. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (2006) (creating a safe harbor for forwardlooking statements); 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2010).
203. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155,
175 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“It is well-established that under typical circumstances, the First
Amendment protects rating agencies, subject to an ‘actual malice’ exception, from
liability arising out of their issuance of ratings and reports because their ratings are
considered matters of public concern.” (citation omitted)); In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 817 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[W]hile
there is no automatic, blanket, absolute First Amendment protection for reports
from the credit rating agencies based on their status as credit rating agencies, the
courts generally have shielded them from liability for allegedly negligent ratings for
various reasons.”); see also Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., Inc., 499
F.3d 520, 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the dismissal of claims against rating
agencies brought on the basis of credit ratings by invoking the protections of the
First Amendment).
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B. Inherent Conflicts in Principal Trading
Perhaps the most controversial of the conflicts of interest to which
financial services providers are subject is proprietary trading. The
underwriting and market-making activities of securities and commodity broker-dealers by their nature entail a conflict of interest, to the
extent that many securities or derivatives contracts are sold out of or
purchased for inventory, whether by the firm itself, an affiliate, or a
third party pursuant to a contractual or other arrangement. Retail
investors who subscribe for IPO securities or who purchase municipal
securities and corporate debt from dealer inventory almost invariably
204
deal directly with a dealer acting as principal. In the context of investment advisory activity, however, Congress and the SEC have subjected such conflicts to fairly extensive disclosure and consent requirements to mitigate the “dumping” of securities into the accounts
205
of managed funds or discretionary accounts.
Another approach would be to segregate marketing or advisory activities from other functions, such as underwriting, dealing, market
making, structuring new products, and proprietary trading. By eliminating conflicts, regulation would preclude misalignment of the
incentives of sales representatives with their clients’ financial interests; as a result, firms would be encouraged to compete based on customer service, rather than the ability to push transactions to customers that benefit the firm financially. Prohibiting affiliations between
public customer business and other financial services might further
206
improve the diligence of employees of financial services firms. The
207
use of independent agents, such as insurance agents, mortgage
brokers, accountants, and occasionally lawyers, is common in many
financial transactions; such agents in theory possess the freedom to
build relationships with several financial services providers with a view
to steering their clients to the products that offer them the best value.

204. The Oliver Wyman Study notes, for example, that municipal and corporate
debt securities are largely sold out of dealer inventory and that a ban on principal
trading would cut customers off from a range of products. OLIVER WYMAN STUDY,
supra note 195, at 15–21.
205. Laby, supra note 20, at 408.
206. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631–32 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
77a) (prohibiting underwriters, placement agents, initial purchasers, or sponsors of
an asset-backed security from engaging “in any transaction that would involve or result in any material conflict of interest with respect to any investor in a transaction
arising out of such activity” for a period of one year, except in connection with riskmitigation activities or market-making or liquidity commitments).
207. Wilkerson, supra note 163, at 526.
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Such strategies have not been successful for a number of reasons.
Segregating the brokerage function (acting as an agent for customers) from the dealing function (buying and selling for one’s account)
would require customers to pay two intermediaries for the simple execution of a stock transaction; independent research and financial
advice would add costs that could be prohibitive for individual inves208
tors.
More generally, financial services providers might argue
209
(however strenuous the opposition) that they can reduce the cost of
searching for and effecting transactions in investment products for
210
their clients if they offer substantially equivalent products in house.
Firms may also possess privileged information and access with respect
to offerings of securities in connection with their underwriting activities that (to the extent legally permissible) may be used to benefit
211
their clients.
Moreover, an absolute prohibition against such affiliations is rare
212
because they may be beneficial to customers.
Financial services
firms have developed a dense web of quid-pro-quo arrangements,
such as marketing fees or payments for order flow, that create similar
213
opportunities to internalize costs and similar conflicts of interest.
Market makers, dealers, and event-registered stock and options exchanges maintain payment-for-order-flow relationships with execut208. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 449; cf. Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell
Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39, 49, 67–80 (2007) (arguing that retail investors,
unlike institutions, cannot afford to buy research, and thus rely on sell-side analysis
subsidized by underwriting/market making activities).
209. See Black, supra note 78, at 87–88 (summarizing criticisms of and litigation
against brokers recommending proprietary mutual funds that carry high costs without disclosing the availability of comparable mutual funds at significantly lower
costs).
210. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 973–76 (2005) (describing the success of the financial services industry in persuading the Department of Labor and state legislatures to permit
fiduciaries to invest beneficiaries’ assets in affiliated mutual funds despite the evident
conflict of interest).
211. Fisch, supra note 208, at 64; Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations, 51 J.L. & ECON. 503, 531 (2008)
(concluding that “while analysts do respond to IB and brokerage conflicts by inflating their stock recommendations, the market discounts these recommendations after
taking analysts’ conflicts into account”). But see In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig.,
465 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39–40 (D. Mass. 2006) (describing the conflict of interest between CSFB’s investment banking and research departments that allegedly compromised the quality of CSFB’s analyst reports); Regulation Analyst Certification, 33–
8193, 68 Fed. Reg. 9482, 9482 (Feb. 27, 2003) (final release) (describing the purpose
of Regulation AC, 17 C.F.R. § 242.500 et seq.).
212. H.R. REP. NO. 106-434 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the purpose of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is “to enhance competition in the financial services industry
by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers, and for other purposes”).
213. Fisch, supra note 126, at 2008; Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 303, 328 (2008).
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ing brokers, even though the SEC has suggested that they may com214
promise the quality of trade executions. Mutual funds pay marketing fees to broker-dealers and other financial services purveyors, in
addition to fees for execution, custodial, and other services, which
215
may create conflicts of interest. Sponsors of securitization vehicles
necessarily pay mortgage brokers and mortgage originators for pro216
viding them with a stream of underlying assets.
While regulators
may adopt rules banning or regulating the fees provided in such relationships (e.g., when they encourage placement of customers into
217
transactions with burdensome terms), or requiring greater transpa218
rency of such fees, firms can constantly create innovative new ways
to funnel money to business partners.
Assuming that such relationships cannot (or should not) be undone, what meaningful results could additional regulation of conflicts of interest under a fiduciary standard produce? As discussed below, the law of agency typically requires the fiduciary to obtain the
consent of the client in good faith after disclosure of all material facts
about the transaction and the conflict of interest. For investment advisers with discretionary trading authority, there is a requirement to
219
provide disclosure and obtain consent transaction by transaction;
214. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34902, 59 Fed. Reg.
55006 (Nov. 2, 1994) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (approving final rules for
payment for order flow practices).
215. See, e.g., Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, Investment Company Act Release No. 26591, 69 Fed. Reg. 54728, 54730
(Sept. 9, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (amending Rule 12b-1 under the Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1, to prohibit evasion of the rules
governing 12b-1 marketing fees through directed brokerage).
216. 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d), (e); Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58512
(Sept. 24, 2010) (describing purpose of rule as “protecting consumers in the mortgage market from unfair practices involving compensation paid to loan originators”
by “prohibit[ing] a creditor or any other person from paying, directly or indirectly,
compensation to a mortgage broker or any other loan originator that is based on a
mortgage transaction’s terms or conditions, except the amount of credit extended”);
see also David Streitfeld, Fed Adopts Rules Meant to Help Protect Home Buyer, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2010, at B3 (describing the Federal Reserve’s proposal to adopt new rules
“banning yield spread premiums, which allowed mortgage brokers and lenders to
gain additional profit from loans by charging borrowers higher-than-market interest
rates”).
217. See supra note 19 (describing Dodd-Frank Act § 1403).
218. See Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58512 (Aug. 16, 2010) (codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (amending Regulation Z to restrict compensation to loan originators that encouraged them to steer borrowers to loans that carried higher-thanmarket interest rates); supra note 218 (payment for order flow); supra note 215 (Rule
12b-1 fees).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006) (requiring disclosure of principal trades “to such
client in writing before the completion of such transaction . . . and obtaining the
consent of the client”); Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 8, 11 Fed. Reg. 10997 (Feb. 5, 1945) (“In my opi-
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whereas, for the typical nondiscretionary account, the financial services provider lacks the authority to consummate the transaction
without consent, but all conflicts are not currently disclosed. Accordingly, in both cases, the benefit of imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers, advisers, bankers, or other financial services provider will rest
primarily on the ability to improve the manner in which disclosure is
provided and the manner in which the client’s consent is secured.
The fact that the securities industry has expressed little discomfort
with the application of a fiduciary duty that can be satisfied through
220
good-faith disclosure and consent suggests that any disclosures required by SEC rulemaking under Section 913 are likely to impose lit221
The SEC has already tipped
tle burden on their business model.
their reluctance to require transaction-by-transaction consent for financial services provides broadly, in light of its position against extending the rules governing principal and agency cross trades under
222
the Investment Advisers Act to broker-dealers.
Disclosure of how
the various components of the financial services industry operate and
interrelate would be too “voluminous” to be of help in any specific
223
transaction.
Such disclosures are unlikely to provide the investor,
phrased as they are with descriptions of a range of possible con224
flicts, with either a quantitative indication of probability or the likelihood that a financial services provider’s incentives to profit from
nion the requirements of written disclosure and of consent contained in this clause
must be satisfied before the completion of each separate transaction. A blanket disclosure and consent in a general agreement between investment adviser and client
would not suffice.”).
220. Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform
Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 110–13 (July
17, 2009) (statement of Randolph C. Snook, Executive Vice President, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association).
221. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 120 (concluding, with a lack of helpful specificity, that “[t]he Commission should address through guidance and/or rulemaking
how broker-dealers should fulfill the uniform fiduciary standard when engaging in
principal trading”).
222. See Investment Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)-1: Certain Broker-Dealers,
17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1 (2010). The original Rule, as proposed, was vacated by
the D.C. Circuit in Financial Planning Assoc. v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir.
2007). See infra Part III.C for further discussion.
223. Id.
224. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(1)(C) (requiring the confirmation provided to the customer to contain “a statement whether payment for order flow is received by the broker or dealer for transactions in such securities and the fact that the
source and nature of the compensation received in connection with the particular
transaction will be furnished upon written request of the customer”) with 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.606(a)(1)(iii) (requiring broker-dealers to “make publicly available” in a quarterly report order routing information that includes, inter alia, “[a] discussion of the
material aspects of the broker’s or dealer’s relationship with each venue identified
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, including a description of any
arrangement for payment for order flow and any profit-sharing relationship”).
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one line of business (dealing) at the expense of another (client services) will be altered by the volume of transactions or the opportunity
for profit. In addition, any such granularly detailed disclosures would
not necessarily provide any guidance as to whether a specific recommendation is, or is not, made in good faith.
C. Ongoing Obligations to Advise
The asymmetry in the perceived duration of investment transactions may also account for some of the tension in applying fiduciary
duties to firms that arrange or execute investment transactions. From
the perspective of the financial services provider, its obligations
should end the moment the transaction is completed. If a firm is
compensated on the basis of completing individual transactions, and
yet is responsible for such transactions for their expected duration
(which in the case of stocks or mutual funds, could be indefinite), the
exponentially increasing burden of monitoring prior transactions
(both with respect to the performance of the asset and the continuing suitability for the investor) is unaffordable. From the firm’s perspective, an ongoing duty would be implied only if there was an opportunity to collect ongoing compensation (e.g., a wrap fee or
mortgage service fee).
On the other hand, from the customer’s perspective, the financial
services provider’s performance is often judged based on the longterm performance of the transaction, particularly if the customer incurs ongoing costs to maintain the investment. Because of the significant interval between the time that the transaction is consummated
and the gains or losses of the transaction are realized, customers may
view the transaction as involving a relational contract with ongoing
obligations on the part of the financial services provider. To the extent that financial services providers create the impression of such a
relationship, whether through the mandatory provision of financial
statements and other disclosures or through the recommendation or
execution of additional transactions, it is understandably difficult for
the customer to appreciate the unwillingness of financial services
providers to accept responsibility for continued performance.
The boundary between recommending securities transactions at a
given point in time and providing investment advice over a period of
time has grown hazy as a result of the transformation of compensa-
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tion models in the securities industry over the past several decades.
Compensation for investment advice has traditionally been structured
as a fixed fee or percentage of assets under management as an incentive to maximize the value of the investors’ portfolios. Brokers, on
the other hand, have traditionally received compensation in the form
of a per-transaction commission, while dealers have received compensation in the form of a “mark-up” on the price of securities sold to
a customer from (or a “mark-down” on the price of securities bought
226
from a customer for) their inventory.
As fee competition among broker-dealers and other discount brokers intensified, brokerage firms experimented with “wrap fees” for a
full complement of brokerage, research, and advisory services based
on assets under management rather than transaction volume and
227
“discount brokerage” fees for self-directed customer accounts. This
collision in business models contributed in no small part to the SEC
228
rulemaking vacated in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC. In that case,
financial planners and investor advocacy groups successfully challenged a Commission rule permitting brokerage firms to offer asset229
based fee structures to non-discretionary brokerage accounts. While
225. As a result, in enacting the Advisers Act, Congress sought to distinguish brokerage activity from investment advisory activity based on compensation structure:
section 202(a)(11) of the Act provides that the term “investment adviser” includes
“any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities,” but subsequently excludes in clause (C) “any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(11)(C). As traditionally interpreted by the Commission, broker-dealers
were not deemed to receive “special compensation” for incidental investment advice
if their compensation consisted solely of the traditional commission received for the
execution of securities transactions. See Opinion of the General Counsel relating to
section 202(a)(11)(C) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2, 11 Fed. Reg. 10996 (Sept. 27, 1946).
226. Integrated firms that offer both brokerage and dealer services may act as
both broker and dealer with respect to a customer transaction and accordingly receive both forms of compensation.
227. Laby, supra note 67, at 406, 415.
228. 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating the exclusion from the definition of
investment adviser for “[c]ertain broker-dealers” in 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1);
Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20424
(Apr. 19, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). In vacating the Commission’s rule,
the majority opinion focused largely on the question whether the Commission could
use its authority under subsection (F) to exclude any “additional” class of brokerdealer not excluded under subsection (C). Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 487. The
majority observed, inter alia, that the Commission had reversed “six decades of consistent SEC understanding” in interpreting subsection (F) in this manner, id. at 490,
and that the Commission’s power to “prescribe different requirements for different
classes of persons or matters” did not give it the power to defy the will of Congress,
id. at 490.
229. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 483. Exclusions were subject, inter alia, to
greater disclosure about the differences between brokerage and investment advisory
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from the Commission’s perspective the development of wrap fees was
salutary to the extent that it eliminated incentives for brokers to engage in aggressive sales practices, the convergence in compensation
models continues to create confusion about what “full service”
brokerage customers are paying for.
One can question the utility of a fiduciary duty to the extent that
that it confuses, rather than clarifies, this asymmetry of expectations.
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example purports not to impose on brokerdealers “a continuing duty of care or loyalty to the customer after
230
providing personalized investment advice.”
If ongoing asset-based
wrap fees in “full-service” nondiscretionary brokerage accounts significantly exceed the discount commissions paid by “self-directed”
accounts on individual transactions, however, “full-service” customers
may believe they are paying premium compensation for some ongoing advisory service, even if account documentation suggests otherwise. Such a system of rules would appear to entrench, rather than
address, the disconnect between the expected and actual benefits of a
fiduciary duty.
D. Availability of Private Relief
Finally, extending the proposed “fiduciary” label to broker-dealers
or other financial services providers may well ring hollow to the extent that no private right of action exists for clients injured by “personalized investment advice.” Advisory clients currently cannot sue
their investment advisers for damages resulting from breach of the
duties enumerated in Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, absent the showing of reliance on a material misstatement or mislead231
ing omission made with scienter as required by Rule 10b-5. Moreover, nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act suggests that private remedies for
breaches of any fiduciary duty created under section 913 are available, and commentators have speculated that the SEC is unlikely to
232
endorse such a range of remedies.

accounts and exclusions for financial planning and discretionary accounts. 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.202(a)(11)-1 (2010).
230. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
231. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19
(1979) (discerning no private right of action for damages under section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act, while acknowledging “the availability of a suit for rescission
or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract”).
232. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 455.
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The purpose of a broad fiduciary duty appears to be to give public
authorities significant flexibility to develop causes of action based on
novel legal theories, particularly in cases where an intent to deceive
may be difficult to establish because no affirmative misstatement is
made to investors about the role being played by the putative fidu233
But public enforceciary in the same or comparable transactions.
ment officials can assert greater flexibility in applying securities law to
the sales practices of financial intermediaries without necessarily labeling such duties as “fiduciary.” For example, courts have applied the
234
more liberal standard of securities fraud in New York’s Martin Act
and section 17(a) of the Securities Act—neither of which creates a
private right of action—to reach conduct that would otherwise not be
actionable under Rule 10b-5, based on a liberal reading of the com235
mon law distinctions between fraud and deceit.
IV. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO A FIDUCIARY STANDARD
In addition to the theoretical problem of extending fiduciary
duties beyond traditional relationships of trust and investment,
adopting a fiduciary standard any subset of financial services providers could pose a number of practical challenges. Any attempt to extend fiduciary duties beyond the realm of securities business—e.g., to
mortgage transactions—would be anathema to banks and bank regulators alike and would compromise efforts to harmonize sales practice
standards for all investment transactions. Regulators would invariably
come under pressure to adopt safe harbors to give financial services
providers greater certainty with respect to routine transactions.
There is also a risk that courts and regulators might simply apply
increasingly commercialized versions of a fiduciary duty to reflect the
realities of modern financial services, and thus undermine the appli233. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963)
(holding that scienter is not required to establish that a practice “operates as a fraud
or deceit upon any client or prospective client” within the meaning of section 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act).
234. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1996) (granting the Attorney General
exclusive authority to bring actions under Martin Act).
235. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (holding that the SEC need not show
scienter to establish that a person was engaged “in a transaction, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit” under section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act); In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.,
823 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding no private right of action under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933). The Martin Act has generally been interpreted to preclude actions under state common law for misrepresentation and
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with transactions “within or from” New York
in the absence of a showing of scienter. Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals Int’l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162–65 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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cation of fiduciary duties in those areas (e.g., investment advisory services and discretionary trading) where they are needed most.
A. Regulatory Competition and Inconsistent Enforcement
The most significant complication in calibrating the obligations of
financial services providers to their clients is the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage create by our fragmented system of financial services
regulation. The differences in sales practice regulation across regulated entities constitute some of the significant remaining obstacles to
236
harmonizing financial services regulation within the United States.
As commercial and investment banks and other financial services
providers have increasingly branched into overlapping lines of business, Congress and federal regulators have only made modest efforts
to standardize business conduct rules—primarily, ministerial “backoffice” practices, such as notifications of privacy policies, money
laundering, telemarketing, sharing of information among affiliates,
237
and identity theft. While the financial crisis has prompted Congress
to consider uniform measures of capital adequacy and to harmonize
238
resolution protocols for financial services firms, sales practice regulation for U.S. financial services providers has thus far escaped efforts
239
at harmonization.
Such disharmony has traditionally been explained by the historical
differences in core products offered by regulated entities; for example, as discussed above, there may be less need to regulate the con236. Helen A. Garten, The Consumerization of Financial Regulation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
287, 315–16 (1999) (arguing that retail consumer protection is the remaining area of
financial regulation that faces regulatory competition problems).
237. See, e.g., David A. DeMuro, et al., Basics of Broker-Dealer Supervision, Outline,
1748 PLI/Corp 129, 141 (2009).
238. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454–55 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384)
(granting the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation the authority to effect an orderly liquidation of “covered financial companies,” including both bank holding
companies and nonbank financial companies, such as investment banks).
239. In other countries, regulatory authority over banking, insurance, securities
and other financial products has been consolidated into a single regulator. See, e.g.,
Eilís Ferran, Examining the United Kingdom’s Experience in Adopting the Single Financial
Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 257, 273–76 (2003) (describing the process by
which the U.K. Financial Services Authority assumed the role of single regulator for
the regulation of banks, securities markets, and insurance companies); Joseph Silvia,
Efficiency and Effectiveness in Securities Regulation: Comparative Analysis of the United
States’s Competitive Regulatory Structure and the United Kingdom’s Single-Regulator Model, 6
DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 247, 258–63 (2008) (comparing the costs and benefits of
the U.K. single regulator model and the U.S. multiple regulator model). See also
TREASURY, BLUEPRINT, supra note 30, 170–80 (proposing a single “Conduct of Business Regulatory Agency” for all financial services, including banking, lending, insurance, futures and securities).
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duct of purveyors of traditional banking products, such as deposits
and mortgages, through sales practice regulation when bank examiners’ focus on safety and soundness precludes the creation of highly
240
dangerous products. Conversely, the high risks undertaken by underwriters, market makers, and other securities dealers may have historically counseled in favor of more rigorous business conduct regu241
lation of securities representatives.
As financial services providers
may now provide a multitude of services in the name of affiliated
companies, such distinctions are anachronistic.
Indeed, the greater threat presently seems to be confusion as to the
level of service that clients receive from their financial services providers. Recent studies have suggested that customers do not appreciate the difference between an investment adviser and a brokerdealer sales representative that provides incidental investment ad242
vice, that certain products sold by bank employees carry FDIC in243
surance while others do not, and that variable annuities marketed
by insurance agents are largely interchangeable with traditional mu244
tual funds. Other differences are more subtle: Derivatives embed245
ded in mortgages or non-financial services—such as the differences
between floating and fixed energy bills or other commodities—are
not regulated as separate financial products, even though customers
240. See supra notes 68 (discussing credit rationing as a tool for protecting lenders
against imperfect information about default risk under the Stiglitz-Weiss model) and
164 (discussing the OCC’s appropriateness policy for derivatives transactions by
national banks).
241. Karmel, supra note 31, at 1275 (discussing the difficulty of finding brokerdealers to be fiduciaries in light of their role as agents or principals).
242. ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND INSTIT. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR & INDUS.
PERSPECTIVES ON INV. ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS xix (2008), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR556.pdf (finding that
“[i]nvestors had difficulty distinguishing among industry professionals and perceiving the web of relationships among service providers”). It is not clear that even regulatory personnel are able to manage such fine distinctions. Scandals involving Madoff Investment Securities, the Stanford Financial Group, and other Ponzi schemes
that have recently unraveled have revived doubts over the murky demarcation among
brokerage, dealing and advisory services. FINRA SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT
OF THE 2009 SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT
OF THE STANFORD AND MADOFF SCHEME 65–72 (September 2009) (discussing FINRA’s
jurisdictional and historical limitations on the examination of investment advisers
and other financial services providers affiliated with FINRA member firms), available
at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/documents/
corporate/p120078.pdf; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE
SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 16–18 (2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf.
243. Helen A. Garten, The Consumerization of Financial Regulation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
287, 295–96 (1999); Sinder, supra note 181, at 59 n.53.
244. Markham, supra note 111, at 793.
245. Macey et al., supra note 20, at 810 (arguing that mortgages are equivalent to
an annuity written by the borrower to the lender while reserving an option to prepay
or put the property to the lender).
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face the same asymmetries of information, sophistication, and ability
to bear risk when selecting from among such products.
Commentators have developed a variety of theories to explain the
obstacles to harmonizing differences in sales practice regulation.
Those sympathetic to the SEC’s efforts to bolster sales practice regulation frequently invoke regulatory capture to explain the tension be246
tween the SEC and the banking agencies. Others cast the tension
in terms of institutional competence, preservation of regulatory turf,
247
or simply differences in culture. While Congress has expanded the
activities in which regulated financial services providers may engage,
it largely has abdicated any role in determining the regulatory juris248
diction of the regulated.
The courts, meanwhile, have expressed over time a preference for
technical construction of obsolescent statutory text in lieu of developing principles to match regulatory jurisdiction to the merits of partic249
250
ular financial products. In American Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, the D.C.
Circuit blocked an attempt by the SEC to address the boundaries between brokerage activity subject to Commission regulation and the
authority of banking regulators over entities chartered as federal or
251
state banks. The Commission’s Rule 3b-9 would have subjected to
Commission regulation any bank that earned “transaction-related
compensation” from brokerage services, whether as an accommodation for existing banking customers or resulting from public solicita252
tion.
246. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 310–313 (1982); Linda B. Matarese, Should the SEC Regulate Banks as Broker-Dealers?, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 145, 169,
171 n.181 (1988) (discussing differences between regulation of the securities business by bank regulators and the SEC in the areas of advertising, sales practices, SIPC
coverage, among others).
247. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAW. 447, 450–51
(1995) (describing role of the House Agriculture Committee in protecting CFTC's
jurisdiction).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 261–264.
249. Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987).
250. 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
251. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the regulation
of “nationally chartered banks,” which are chartered under 12 U.S.C. § 21. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System supervises bank holding companies and state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System; the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation supervises state-chartered banks not subject
to the Board’s supervision.
252. Notwithstanding the exclusion of banks from the statutory definitions of
“broker” and “dealer” in the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)–(5), the Commission predicated its authority to exclude banks engaged in for-profit brokerage servic-
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Noting that Congress was aware of the various securities-related ac253
tivities in which banks had traditionally engaged, the court noted
that the term “bank” was “defin[ed] . . . in terms of the government
agencies that regulated them,” rather than the specific functions they
254
performed (i.e., deposit-taking) and that the exclusion of banks
from registration as brokers and dealers was thus “but one part of a
consistent congressional policy of keeping oversight of the banking
system separate from the SEC’s oversight of the securities trading and
255
investment industries.”
The Court notably refused to consider
whether Congress would have granted the SEC the power to regulate
the brokerage activities of banks had it anticipated that bank regulators might interpret Glass-Steagall to permit banks to engage in retail
bank brokerage activity.
In the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Congress clarified that
banks may engage in securities-related activities, subject to the requirement to “push out” activities other than certain enumerated activities that constituted traditional banking activity into a subsidiary
256
subject to Commission regulation. The trouble is that Congress has
left it to the federal agencies to squabble among themselves as to the
appropriate allocation of regulation through a variety of legislative
257
258
gimmicks.
Joint rulemaking exercises,
consultation requirees from the scope of the statutory definition based on (i) the statutory qualification
that Congress’ definitions were open to reinterpretation if “the context otherwise
requires,” § 78c(a), and (ii) the Commission’s power “to define technical, trade, accounting, and other terms used in [the Exchange Act], consistently with [its] provisions and purposes,” § 78c(b).
253. These included investment advising, agency brokerage, custodial and transmittal services. See Am. Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(quoting the testimony of William Potter, Chairman, Guaranty Trust Co.). Many of
these services may continue to be offered by banks without registration as a broker or
dealer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (listing exclusions from the definition of “broker” and “dealer” for certain bank activities).
254. Am. Bankers Ass’n, 804 F.2d at 747.
255. Id.
256. 15 U.S.C. § 78c3(a)(4)(b)(i); S. Rep. No. 106-44, 9–10 (1999) (discussing the
history of bank securities activities and the justifications for requiring some, but not
all, securities activities of banks to be conducted through an SEC-regulated brokerdealer affiliate).
257. For example, while Congress initially granted the Commission the authority
to determine the scope of activities that would trigger broker-dealer registration under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it subsequently mandated joint rulemaking between
the SEC and bank regulators after the SEC published a proposing release containing
rules to which the banking community objected. Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 201-02, 113 Stat. 1338, 1385–91 (1999) (amending the definitions of “broker” and “dealer” in sections 3(a)(4)-(5) of the Exchange Act), with Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, 120 Stat. 1966,
1968 (amending section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act by adding a joint rulemaking
requirement for implementing exceptions to the definition of “broker” under subparagraph (B)).
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ments, dual registration of financial intermediaries and “jump
ball” provisions giving regulators the right to challenge one another’s
261
turf in federal court have become troublingly commonplace in the
regulation of business practices in the financial community. To the
extent that Congress is unable to articulate a coherent vision of how
regulatory authority should be functionally allocated, it is up to the
SEC, the CFTC, federal and state banks, and insurance and consumer
protection regulators to find ways to harmonize their respective regulatory frameworks.
B. Safe Harbors for Compliance
Another challenge to extending fiduciary or professional obligations to financial services providers is the need to define categories of
products or transactions that fulfill the provider’s fiduciary duty without further action. Safe harbors are routinely developed to guide fiduciaries in structuring transactions or making decisions on behalf of
a principal in a manner that minimizes the risk of challenge and subsequent judicial review. Unlike regulations that prohibit unfair or
258. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(D) (requiring joint SEC-CFTC rulemaking to establish rules for classifying foreign indices as “narrow-based securities indices” for
purposes of allocating jurisdiction over related index futures and index options);
§ 78g(c)(2)(B) (providing for joint SEC-CFTC rulemaking pursuant to delegated
authority from the Federal Reserve Board regarding margin requirements for security futures products).
259. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 712(a)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. 1641, 1641–42 (2010) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 8302) (requiring the CFTC to consult and coordinate with the SEC, and
vice versa, before “commencing any rulemaking or issuing an order regarding swaps,
swap dealers, major swap participants”); id. § 712(a)(7), at 1642 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 8302) (requiring such rules to “treat functionally or economically similar
products or entities . . . in a similar manner”); id. § 712(d)(3), at 1645 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 8302) (requiring the Financial Stability Oversight Council to resolve
any dispute between the SEC and CFTC regarding such rulemaking).
260. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6f(a)(1), 15(b)(11) (requiring dual registration of brokers
and dealers that trade security futures products). Compare 7 U.S.C. § 7b-1 (2006)
(setting forth requirements for securities exchanges required to register as contract
markets), with 15 U.S.C. § 78f(g) (requiring a designated contract market trading
securities futures to register as a securities exchange).
261. See 7 U.S.C. § 27d (granting the Federal Reserve Board a similar right of consultation and challenge with respect to any CFTC rule regulating a hybrid instrument
that the CFTC has determined not to be predominantly a banking product);
15 U.S.C. § 78o(i) (granting the Federal Reserve Board a right of consultation and a
right to challenge before the D.C. Circuit any SEC rule imposing broker or dealer
registration requirements with respect to any new hybrid product, based on whether
imposing such a requirement “is appropriate in light of the history, purpose, and extent of regulation under the Federal securities laws and under the Federal banking
laws, giving deference neither to the views of the Commission nor the Board”);
Dodd-Frank Act § 712(c), 124 Stat. at 1643–44 (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 8302)
(permitting either Commission to petition for judicial review of the other’s rulemaking).
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deceptive practices or limit investment to certain approved prod262
ucts, the purpose of the exercise is to put investors on notice that
certain products may pose greater risk or greater complexity than
more “plain vanilla” products.
In specific contexts, the financial intermediary’s duty of loyalty is
exhaustively defined by statute and regulation. ERISA, for example,
prohibits transactions between a private plan and a fiduciary or transactions between a private plan and any “party in interest” caused by a
263
fiduciary unless effected pursuant to a specific exemption, with the
understanding that the associated regulators (the Secretaries of
Labor and the Treasury) would exercise exemptive authority to provide guidance to persons providing brokerage or management servic264
es.
In some cases, such statutes are expressly designed to displace
open-ended fiduciary duties or duties of disclosure, whereas in others, courts may be inclined to infer displacement to provide definitive
265
guidance to financial services providers.
An example of such a regulatory safe harbor in the Dodd-Frank Act
is the classification and treatment of certain “qualified mortgages.”
To the extent that mortgage originators are subject to a professional

262. Root, supra note 70, at 353 (describing evolution from “legal lists” to modern
portfolio theory). The Dodd-Frank Act creates a process by which any person that
proposes to list or trade a “novel derivative product” may seek a determination from
the SEC and the CFTC (subject to judicial review) as to whether such product is a
“security” or “contract for future delivery,” “commodity option” or “option on a contract for future delivery,” but gives the agencies no special authority to regulate such
products. Dodd-Frank Act § 718, 124 Stat. at 1652–54 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 8306).
263. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (prohibiting a fiduciary with respect to an ERISA plan from
entering into certain transactions with the plan or causing the plan to enter into certain transactions with a “party in interest”); HARVEY E. BINES & STEVE THEL,
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LAW AND REGULATION, § 2.04{b}{1], at 64–65 (2d ed. 2004)
(stating the “general principle” that “unless expressly exempted, any transaction (1)
with an employee benefit plan by a fiduciary for its own account, or (2) between a
plan and a party in interest . . . or a disqualified person . . . caused by a fiduciary is
prohibited”).
264. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (providing the Secretary of Labor with the authority to
grant exemptions “if administratively feasible, in the interests of the plan and of its
participants and beneficiaries, and protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of such plan”); H.R. Rep 1280, 93d Cong. 309–310 (1974); see also BINES &
THEL, supra note 270, § 11.02[B][1], at 740. For example, the Department of Labor
has promulgated a “prohibited transaction exemption” for “qualified plan asset
managers” that are deemed “independent of the parties in interest and which meet
specified financial standards.” Class Exemption for Plan Asset Transaction Determined by Independent Qualified Professional Asset Managers 84-14, 49 Fed. Reg.
9494 (March 13, 1984), as amended in 70 Fed. Reg. 43905 (Aug. 23, 2005).
265. Cf. Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 218 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining compliance with Rule 10b-10 requirement regarding disclosure of third party
remuneration was sufficient to avoid liability for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5).
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or fiduciary “duty of care” in originating mortgages, the Act creates
a presumption that a consumer has the “ability to pay” a mortgage
that meets certain statutory criteria and standards implemented by
regulation related to the loan’s duration and amortization schedule,
the ratio of monthly debt to monthly income resulting from the loan,
the ratio of total points and fees to the size of the loan, and the
spread between the loan’s interest rate and the average prime offer
267
rate.
Such rules create an incentive for mortgage originators to
conform to the terms dictated by the statute and implement regulations to avoid subsequent challenge under the statute’s duty of care
268
and the attendant penalties.
Such approaches are not without their flaws. First, to the extent
that sales practice rules should provide some protection to institutional or sophisticated investors, regulatory guidelines are not easily
extensible to such transactions; some residual fiduciary or professional duty would therefore be necessary to address complex transactions.
Second, such approaches presuppose that regulators are able to establish and maintain guidelines on an ongoing basis for suitable and
unsuitable investment transactions. For example, only in 2008, did
Congress and the Department of Labor permit managers of defined
contribution plans to invest unallocated employee contributions to a
269
default option other than money market mutual funds, on the
theory that the Department did not want to create a safe harbor pro270
tecting fiduciaries from litigation in the event of a decline in value.

266. See supra text accompanying notes 6–19 (describing the Dodd-Frank Act’s
imposition of such duties).
267. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1422, 124 Stat. 1376, 2157 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638a).
268. Id. § 1404, at 2141 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b) (extending liability
under section 130 of the Truth in Lending Act to mortgage originators in breach of
such duties for the greater of actual damages or an amount equal to three times the
total amount of compensation or gain accruing to the mortgage originator, plus
costs and attorneys’ fees); id. § 1413, at 2148–49 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(k)) (providing that a consumer may assert a violation of such duties as a matter of defense by recoupment or set off in the face of a judicial foreclosure at any
time notwithstanding the statute of limitations under section 130 of the Truth in
Lending Act).
269. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (protecting such a fiduciary from liability “for any
loss. . . that is the direct and necessary result of . . . investing all or part of a participant’s or beneficiary’s account in any qualified default investment alternative,” as
defined in the rule); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5), as amended by section 624 of the
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
270. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 131 (2008) (noting the Department of Labor’s “reluctance . . . to issue guidelines officially blessing (by granting a “safe harbor” status)
any fund that could ever decline in value”).
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Third, they create a perception that certain investments are government-sanctioned, which creates political pressure for protecting
such investments through fiscal or monetary policy, particularly when
there are significant inducements for the certifying body to grant
more favorable treatment. For example, the favorable treatment assigned to certain mortgage-backed securities under capital adequacy
rules encouraged financial services providers, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds to concentrate holdings. This overconcentration, and subsequent collapse of the market when defaults started
mounting, triggered unprecedented intervention by the Federal Re271
serve to stabilize prices indefinitely.
From the perspective of firms, such approaches pose a risk of stifling innovation to the extent that deviations from favored products
can give rise to significant liability. Professor Jill Fisch has addressed
this problem by proposing a rule that would provide financial innovators with a safe harbor from the imposition of fiduciary remedies if,
among other things, such innovators either offer transactions that
“conform” to regulatory guidelines or “explain” material deviations
272
therefrom.
The protective effect of such disclosures, however, is
unclear for either investors or financial services providers. To the extent that such safe harbors, by implication, deal with novel terms, reviewing courts may well focus on the subjective intent of the offeror
rather than the objective materiality of the deviations—this, in turn,
would impair investors’ ability to challenge the suitability of novel
products.
C. The Trend to Commercialize Fiduciary Duties
A third complication with imposing fiduciary duties on all investment recommendations is that it would invariably lead legislatures
and courts to “commercialize” fiduciary obligations, either through
codification of fiduciary obligations or by developing legal presumptions or defenses that neutralize prima facie claims. Fiduciary duties
of loyalty and care, like all standards applied ex post facto in administrative or judicial proceedings, in theory would shift the burden onto
financial services providers, individually and collectively, to develop
norms of conduct to be tested in enforcement proceedings and pri271. Expressing concern over the possibility of such “moral hazard,” Congress
commissioned a study of the feasibility of creating an SRO or similar public or private entity to assign NRSROs to determine credit ratings. Id. § 939F(b)(2)(C), at
1889 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9).
272. Fisch, supra note 213, at 103, 117, 118 (explaining that a safe harbor from
fiduciary duties or antifraud rules exists only if there is adequate disclosure of nonconforming features of a particular product).
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vate litigation, and to make adequate provision for the legal risks re273
Fiduciary standards,
sulting from any foray into novel services.
however, may be so open-ended, particularly if sanctions or remedies
are sought well after the offending conduct has occurred, that their
application by courts or arbitrators might well appear highly arbitrary
274
from the perspective of both firms and their clients.
To the extent that fiduciary duties may be limited or eliminated by
275
agreement, judicial forbearance is all that is required to blunt their
276
impact.
SIFMA’s endorsement of fiduciary duties, as long as the
impact of such duties can be rendered “business-model neutral”
277
through disclosure and waiver of conflicts, reflects this trend. In
private placements and over-the-counter offerings, firms have long
sought to negotiate “no reliance” clauses, “big boy letters,” and similar clauses disaffirming any duty of care or reliance on the firm’s ad278
vice for purposes of federal securities law and state agency law. Of
course, commentators argue that fiduciary duties should continue to
279
play an “extracontractual” role to prevent abusive contracting, or at

273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 961–968 (1995)
(contrasting, inter alia, the strengths and weaknesses of rules, standards, and principles as sources of law); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621–24 (1992) (contrasting the ex ante costs of developing rules
with the ex post costs of applying and enforcing standards)
274. Lowenfelds & Bromberg, supra note 155, at 1584 (noting that the securities
industry’s concern with respect to unsuitability claims “has been exacerbated within
the last decade,” among other factors, by the shift of private actions from the courts
to arbitration tribunals and “a concomitant shift in the legal basis for unsuitability
claims from an interpretation and application of rules promulgated by the SEC
under the federal securities laws to an interpretation and application of the suitability rules promulgated by the SROs”); Karmel, supra note 31, at 1293–97 (noting that
“arbitration is a business forum, not a court of law, and arbitrators need not follow
legal precedent”); Black, supra note 79, at 103 (“Whatever its imperfections, the
FINRA arbitration forum presents a great advantage from the investors’ perspective:
its emphasis on equity allows arbitrators to fashion a remedy for investors that may
not be supported by the law.”).
275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006).
276. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards
and Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2743, 2749 (2006) (discussing the
drawbacks of and Uniform Trust Code limits placed on waivers for skill and conflicts).
277. SEC REPORT, supra note 24, at 113.
278. The SEC’s general counsel has taken the position that attempts to disclaim
liability for ordinary negligence may be void and may further be fraudulent, to the
extent that such liability cannot be waived under federal securities law. See, e.g.,
Interpretive Releases Relating to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and General Rules
and Regulations Thereunder, 16 Fed. Reg. 3387 (Apr. 18, 1951) (opining that such
clauses may be void under section 215(a) and violative of sections 206(1) and 206(2)
of the Investment Advisers Act).
279. Ramirez, supra note 68, at 563.
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least a suppletive role when conflicts of interest cannot be adequately
280
defined or addressed by contract.
In other contexts, courts have taken the initiative in fashioning
doctrines that relieve fiduciaries of the more onerous aspects of the
duty of loyalty and care when it might otherwise impair the efficiency
of the fiduciary’s performance. Whereas the law of asset management once imposed very detailed prescriptions for investment decision making under the prudent man rule, courts and legislators have
significantly liberalized the parameters within which asset managers
281
exercise their duty of care. In the context of corporate law, the duty of care has been rendered largely a procedural rule, rather than a
282
substantive rule, in order to free directors to take calculated risks.
At the same time, courts have carved out safe harbors from prohibitions against self-dealing, dual agency, or other conflicts of interest to
accommodate financial services providers operating in multiple ca283
pacities as long as they act in an objectively “fair” manner.
284
This term’s decision in Jones v. Harris Associates is perhaps the
most recent illustration of judicial attitudes with respect to fiduciary
duties in the context of financial services. The fiduciary duty at issue
in Harris Associates was created by Congress in Section 36(b) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, which creates a private right of action against the investment adviser of a registered company for
breach of “fiduciary” duty in connection with the adviser’s compensa285
tion.
The statutory language was meant to serve as a compromise
280. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209
(1995).
281. See, e.g., BINES & THEL, supra note 270. § 8.02, at 365–98 (tracing the evolution
of prudent-investor jurisprudence in both case law and statutory law from the Second
Restatement of Trusts to the Third Restatement).
282. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“As for
the plaintiffs' contention that the directors failed to exercise ‘substantive due care,’
we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts
do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if
they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decision-making context is
process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.”).
283. Leslie, supra note 283, at 2713. For example, legislators in most states have
permitted trustees to purchase proprietary mutual funds for trusts. Id. at 2733 &
n.68. Trustees can avoid “further inquiry” of beneficial owners by engaging in “fair”
transactions with principal. Id. at 2721. But see John H. Langbein, Questioning the
Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 931 (2005)
(defending “no further inquiry” rule).
284. 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
285. More specifically, section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940
deems investment advisers of mutual funds registered as an investment company “to
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by
the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of
such investment adviser.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). Section 36(b) further allows
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between traditional corporate law remedies for excessive compensation—which requires shareholders of a mutual fund to show that the
directors had committed waste in agreeing to an excessive compensation arrangement with the investment adviser—and granting the SEC
the authority to set “reasonable” compensation for mutual fund ad286
visers through some sort of ratemaking process.
The prevailing test for reviewing investment adviser compensation
under Section 36(b) was articulated by the Second Circuit in Garten287
berg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc. In that case, the Second
Circuit concluded that the test for excessive compensation is “essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range
of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all
of the surrounding circumstances,” and more specifically, whether
the fee charged is “so disproportionately large that it bears no rea288
sonable relationship to the services rendered.”
Among the “pertinent facts” a reviewing court was required to weigh in making this determination were “the adviser-manager’s cost in providing the
service,” the adviser’s ability to realize “economies of scale as the fund
grows larger,” and “the volume of orders which must be processed by
289
the manager.”
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Harris Associates,
the petitioner challenged, in the Court of Appeals below, the differential fee structure Harris Associates applied to its “captive” retail and
institutional mutual funds and other independently managed funds.
The Seventh Circuit, departing from the reasoning in Gartenberg,
viewed the fiduciary requirement in section 36(b) as little more than
a requirement to disclose conflicts of interest. In its view, competition among mutual funds, based on full disclosure of compensation
arrangements, was sufficient incentive for fund managers and investment advisers to avoid “excessive” fees; fund advisers, under the
Seventh Circuit’s logic, should be permitted to negotiate at “arm’s
length” for differential compensation for different levels of research.
shareholders in such funds to bring a suit against the investment adviser in the right
of the mutual fund “for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or
payments.” Id.
286. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 16 (1969) (noting the Senate Committee’s belief that a
private action for breach of fiduciary duty “provides an effective method whereby the
courts can determine whether there has been a breach of this duty by the adviser or
by certain other persons with respect to their compensation from the fund” and favoring “industry self-regulation” over “recommending that the Congress set a maximum statutory commission rate for mutual fund sales loads”).
287. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
288. Id. at 928.
289. Id. at 930.
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In the wake of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, some commentators
made even more aggressive assertions about adviser compensation—
for example, suggesting that an investment adviser who consistently
generates abnormally high returns should be entitled to keep a significant percentage of those returns in the form of higher advisory fees
to the same extent as private equity and hedge fund managers share
290
in the returns they generate for their clients.
In interpreting section 36(b), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
reasoning in Gartenberg with a view to upholding the fiduciary concept
without engaging in ratemaking or reflexively relying on market
competition. In particular, the Court focused on the need to “take
into account both procedure and substance” when assessing whether
291
the fee comported with the investment adviser’s fiduciary duty.
Noting that Congress had already stiffened the requirements for the
independence of mutual fund directors vis-à-vis the advisory fund, it
292
rejected judicial “second-guessing” of “informed board decisions.”
Thus, “[w]here a board’s process for negotiating and reviewing investment-adviser compensation is robust, a reviewing court should afford commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining
293
process.”
Conversely, “where the board’s process was deficient or
the adviser withheld important information, the court must take a
294
more rigorous look at the outcome.”
The Supreme Court thus recognized that the law can, in relevant
ways, shift the burden to financial services providers to develop substantive and procedural safeguards when setting the terms of their relationship with their clients. But its decision reinforces the perception that fiduciary duties, in the context of financial services, are
fundamentally duties of process and candor, with substantive scrutiny
of particular transactions only in rare cases when those requirements
are not met. Extending an open-ended fiduciary duty to financial
services providers who make investment recommendations may ultimately accomplish little more than backstop existing internal controls and mandatory disclosures required by financial regulators or
self-regulatory bodies. Even forceful advocates of raising sales prac-

290. Johnsen, supra note 75, at 590 (arguing that if a fund generates abnormal returns, it is not inappropriate for manager to charge higher fees).
291. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. at 1429.
292. Id. at 1430.
293. Id.
294. Coffee Testimony, supra note 56, at 19–20; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(a); Langevoort, supra note 62, at 688.
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tice standards have conceded that such standards must be articulated
295
in a manner that avoids imposing quantitative guidelines.
V. CAPTURING THE ESSENCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
This article argues that there is a case for applying certain disclosures of a fiduciary nature consistently across all financial services
providers, as long as compliance can clearly be defined ex ante and
customers clearly understand the contours, if not the precise limits,
of their financial services provider’s duties. The essence of fiduciary
duty when making investment recommendations, as described above,
should be good faith disclosure of both qualitative and quantitative
information about the financial services provider’s basis for making a
recommendation, as well as any conflicts of interest affecting the
financial services provider’s judgment, coupled with a requirement to
make the customer whole if the customer suffers a loss proximately
caused by the breach of such duties.
Accordingly, this article speculates that such a fiduciary duty would
be manageable if financial services providers could qualify for a safe
harbor by providing their clients with certain quantitative information in good faith about their proprietary assessment of the risk of the
transaction. Specifically, the mandatory offer of a put option “married” to investment transactions, or offer of a comparable hedging
transaction, can function more effectively than a fiduciary “put” at
communicating risks, sanitizing conflicts, and shaping client expectations. Several scholars have explored the use of “revealing options”
or “self-assessment” as a means to encourage or compel parties to
communicate information about their valuation of entitlements or
296
tort damages, or as a means of valuing the right to sue, for example,
297
for claims of expropriation.
295. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1342 (advocating a suitability standard for mortgage products, but conceding that could devolve into price regulation
if not adequately articulated). See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 941(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1890–96 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9) (requiring federal banking agencies, the SEC, the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development, and the Director of the Federal Housing
Finance Agency to jointly define the term “qualified residential mortgage,” for
purposes of the Act’s credit risk retention requirement, by reference to “underwriting and product features that historical loan performance data indicate result in a
lower risk of default,” including the mortgagor’s residual income after the payment
of all monthly obligations and the ratio of both monthly mortgage payments and total monthly installment payments to the mortgagor’s monthly income).
296. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1434 (2005)
(arguing that the use of “entitlements subject to self-made options” in lieu of liability
rules as a means of allowing entitlement holders in “name-your-own liability” regime
will enhance “entitlement holder's autonomy”); Ian Ayres, Protecting Property With

DOMBALAGIAN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE ESSENCE OF DUTY

6/5/2011 4:17 PM

1327

This approach would also complement regulatory efforts to supplement, or in some cases substitute, qualitative guidance with quan298
titative or empirical information about market risk. Recent scholarship has explored the possibility of that institutional investors might
find it useful to rely on credit default swap spreads, in lieu of or in
addition to investment grade ratings, for regulatory and risk299
management purposes; these initiatives follow on the coattails of
the SEC’s own efforts to eliminate regulatory reliance on investment
300
Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act has championed
grade ratings.
greater disclosure about the specific assets underlying asset-backed
securities. This proposal takes these initiatives one step further by
requiring firms to disclose, in discrete quantities, their proprietary
assessment of the markets they offer customers.
A. The Proposal
Consider the following requirement: When recommending an in301
vestment transaction, a financial services provider enjoys a safe harPuts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 803 (1998) (arguing for the use of “puts” as a means of
protecting victims of nuisance because, inter alia, “put options share the same core
advantage of traditional liability rules: they harness the private information of the
option holder”); Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68
VA. L. REV. 771, 771, 779 (1982) (building on the notion that “the individual who is
most familiar with a property right is also likely to be the party best able to put a
monetary value on that interest” in order to develop mechanisms for owners to publicly communicate proprietary information about—and thus for courts to more predictably determine—the value of property, tort damages, and difficult-to-value
shares).
297. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent
Domain, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 416–21 (2009) (arguing that the right to bring
a lawsuit can be valued using real options theory for purposes of determining “just
compensation” when the government seeks to condemn a prospective plaintiff’s
right to bring a lawsuit against a third party); see also Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to
Sue: An Option-pricing Approach, 19 J LEGAL STUD. 173, 174 (1990) (“Filing a suit is analogous to purchasing an option, because it gives the plaintiff the right to proceed toward trial without having the obligation to try the case.”).
298. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 205, at 1626.
299. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery et al., Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes
for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2113–14 (finding support for the conclusion that “CDS spreads reflect information more quickly and accurately than credit
ratings”) (2010).
300. See also Dodd-Frank Act § 939(a)–(e), 124 Stat. at 1885–86 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1817) (replacing references to ratings and related terms, such as “investment grade,” in various statutes governing financial institutions with delegation
of authority to individual agencies to develop “standards of credit-worthiness”); id.
§ 939A, at 1887 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 78o-7) (requiring federal agencies to
review and, as necessary, modify any regulations that require assessments of creditworthiness or refer to or require reliance on credit ratings).
301. I propose to define “recommendation” to refer to communications by a financial services provider reasonably intended to solicit a specific transaction, as used
in FINRA’s suitability rule. See NASD Rule 2310, FINRA Manual (CCH) 17,155
(2009). This definition would exclude, for example, general advice about financial
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bor from liability based on a breach of the duty of care or a conflict
of interest if it offers its customers in good faith a “put” or “collar”
giving the customer the ability to rescind the transaction at an arbitrary percentage of the initial investment amount (e.g., eighty percent) within an arbitrary period (e.g., one year) after each debit of
customer funds (e.g., payment of the purchase price, payment of interest and principal on a loan, or posting of additional margin in a
302
securities or commodities account).
Analogous rules could be extended to annuities and other insurance products, as well as mortgages—for example, lenders could be required to offer and price the
right to “put” an underlying property to the lender via a non-recourse
mortgage.
On the one hand, customers who elect to purchase the additional
protection would forgo the “fiduciary put” they would enjoy under
law—i.e., the ability to rescind a transaction within the statutory limitations period for all or part of the purchase price if they can demonstrate a breach of fiduciary duty in a judicial or arbitral proceeding—
with an option that has clearly defined price and time parameters.
From both the perspective of the financial services provider and the
customer, the good faith offer and purchase of such an option eliminates the indeterminacy of fiduciary duty. On the other hand, if the
customer chooses not to purchase the option, the mere fact of making such an offer in good faith would reveal significant information

planning, allocation of assets, and other transactions not involving specific financial
products. Id. It would also not apply to situations in which a member acts “solely as
an order-taker for persons who, on their own initiative, effect transactions without a
recommendation from the member.” NASD Notice to Members 96–60, Clarification
of Members’ Suitability Responsibilities Under NASD Rules on Member Activities in
Speculative
and
Low-Priced
Securities
(Sept.
1996),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/noties
/p016905.pdf. As the NASD has noted, a “broad range of circumstances may cause a
transaction to be considered recommended,” including, for example, dissemination
of forecasts, research reports, or other communications by a financial service provider designed to draw a customer’s attention to a financial product. Id.; see Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, 54 Fed. Reg. 35468, 35476–77
(Aug. 28, 1989); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 156, at 1560–61 (describing industry concerns about NASD’s suitability rule and definition of “recommendation”);
NASD Notice to Members 96–60, supra (maintaining that it is facts-and-circumstances
that determine whether a transaction is “recommended”); see also Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities: An Agency Theory
of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 542 n.17 (2005) (discussing Internet
broker-dealers and recommendations).
302. In the case of a “married put,” the required disclosures would consist of, at a
minimum, the premium required to purchase the option; in the case of a “collar,”
the required disclosure would consist, at a minimum, of the cap on the upside gains
of the transaction as a condition of receiving the downside protection.
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about the financial services provider’s estimation of the risk entailed
in entering into the transaction.
An accurately priced “put” premium would convey to even the least
financially literate customer some relative sense of the risk of an investment transaction—particularly when viewed in comparison to the
premiums associated with other products. Keeping disclosure down
to simple numbers will facilitate efforts at improving numeracy of in303
vestors across product classes.
Moreover, requiring that such
options and associated price information be offered as part of the solicitation of the transaction would force the kind of disruption in the
selling process that is desirable to overcome the aggressive sales pitch
touting the virtues of a particular investment.
B. Defining Good-Faith Information
The key to implementing such a proposal is to ensure that the option is accurately priced, which is where the law of fiduciary duty can
play a critical role. Targeting the financial services provider’s fiduciary duty on the narrow question of providing an accurate price for
the option would eliminate much of the qualitative second-guessing
of an investment recommendation. Instead, it would focus any ex
post facto inquiry on the accuracy of the price-setting process and the
adequacy of internal controls designed to capture all relevant information within the firm’s possession that should influence that
process. In particular, requiring firms to use a consistent price across
all customer transactions that is derived from a consistent proprietary
methodology creates a record that regulatory or self-regulatory
authorities can easily audit to ensure that customers are treated fairly.
For products that have an externally derived reference price (e.g.,
publicly traded options on securities, commodity futures, interest rate
futures), quoting an option at the public price—or even offering to
purchase a corresponding option on such a market—would suffice.
For many financial services providers, this would create an incentive
to offer customers highly standardized products that can easily be
hedged rather than to tack on additional features that may generate
additional fees but increase rescission risk.
To the extent that there are no perfect hedges, self-regulatory bodies might be charged, in the first instance, with identifying which
listed contracts are suitable for hedging particular investment transactions in accordance with the procedures currently used, such as set303. See Fanto, supra note 22, at 111 (arguing that agencies should require customer disclosure to match educational initiatives).
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ting margin requirements for options and futures strategies. For
nonfungible underlying assets, such as real property, self-regulatory
bodies might permit regional indices, if available, to substitute for
loan-level information. Regulators might also exclude certain products whose risk of default is minimal, or at least ascertainable using
commonly available information—such as certain government securities and FDIC-insured certificates of deposit. Likewise, where the financial services provider itself guarantees performance of a product—such as a covered bond, fixed income annuity, guaranteed
investment contract, or principal-protected security issued by the financial services provider—the firm itself should not generally be
304
required to quote an option on its own solvency.
For other products and transactions—particularly those involving
nonfungible underlying assets, such as real property—there is a risk
that firms will either overprice or underprice the option. A firm may
have an incentive to overprice in order to discourage customers from
purchasing such protection or to bilk unsophisticated customers by
tacking on additional fees. A firm may have an incentive to underprice the option in order to downplay the risk of the transaction, if it
can otherwise effectively discourage the customer from purchasing
the option. In these cases, compliance with the fiduciary duty to individual customers becomes a question of whether the firm has implemented internal controls that meet regulatory standards (as affirmed by a regulatory or self-regulatory body) and whether the price
generated was determined in accordance with those procedures.
To qualify for a safe harbor from fiduciary analysis, such controls
would likely have to ensure that option premiums either (i) reflect
contemporaneous cost, if the firm does not engage in market making
or proprietary trading with respect to the transaction, or (ii) reflect
the firm’s own internal projection(s) of the expected value of the option if it does. To say that the option must reflect contemporaneous
cost is not to say that firms are not entitled to turn a profit: the proposal does not prohibit them from charging a commission, fee, markup, markdown, or other costs in connection with the transaction itself. Such fees may take into account the administrative or other
costs associated with the offering of such options as well. But to the
extent that the purpose of communicating the value of the option is
to shield the transaction from a claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
304. Michael Durrer et al., The Proposed United States Covered Bond Act of 2010, 127
BANKING L.J. 632 (2010) (describing the operation of covered bond programs); Johnsen, supra note 75, at 565 (describing FIAs).
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the precision of price cannot be clouded by spreads, markups, markdowns, or other distortive influences.
Even more controversial, perhaps, would be the requirement that
firms incorporate price information from their own underwriting,
market making, and proprietary trading activities in determining the
value of the proposed option. From a technical standpoint, this proposal presents the obvious question whether a “single” price would
even be possible to derive, to the extent that each trader or unit within a firm may employ different models. From the investing public’s
point of view, the choice of internal model is not necessarily as important as consistency in the use of the model by a particular financial services provider, insofar as the exercise is a comparative one.
Moreover, to the extent that risk management in financial services
firms of any significant size is required to use a single model, the
appropriate universe of models can be confined to those employed in
that department.
More substantively, financial services providers may argue that fiduciary duties should not require disclosure of confidential information regarding their proprietary trading strategies gathered in the
course of their representation of particular issuers or clients. Of
course, every securities, derivative, or other financing transaction
reveals certain information about each counterparty’s trading positions, and the proposal does not contemplate requiring public customers to keep any such information confidential, for to do so would
frustrate the purpose of facilitating comparison shopping. To the extent that the proposal is designed with the goal of providing information as concisely as possible—i.e., a snapshot of the firm’s view as to
the expected performance of the transaction expressed as a single
number—reverse engineering proprietary trading strategies is likely
305
to be very difficult. Moreover, a firm would always be free to forgo
offering the option, and thus face the risk of an ex post adjudication
of breach of fiduciary duty.
C. Customer Interaction
The proposal substantially relies on the average customer’s ability
to appreciate the importance, and limitations, of a married put or
305. In this respect, the proposal is much more conservative than proposals advanced to require public disclosure of proprietary trading models for purposes of
containing systemic risk. Cf. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 127, 189 (2009) (proposing an “open-source” approach to prudential regulation
in which “that banks seeking to use internal risk models for setting their capital requirements publicly disclose the details of those risk models”).
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similar contract. Practically speaking, it will rarely be possible or desirable to claim a safe harbor from fiduciary duties when the financial
services provider had “dominated or controlled” the customer, or
otherwise managed the customer’s account on a de facto discretionary basis. And of course, the financial services provider will lose the
safe harbor if it has not acted in good faith—for example, by offering
a product that technically complies with the provisions of the safe
harbor but is intentionally designed to evade the purposes of applicable law.
But the proposal remains subject to a behaviorist critique that providing quantitative information without context can exacerbate the
306
perceived weaknesses in decisions about investment transactions.
Moreover, the exercise may prove largely futile in enabling customers
to make long-term investment decisions if contracts can be structured
to shift risk into the future. It may be possible, however, to use the
tools identified in the behaviorist literature to make the “optionality”
conversation as informative as the disclosed price information itself.
First, the safe harbor should require that information about the
married put or similar option be communicated and updated during
each material communication (oral or written) with the customer
307
about the transaction. A self-regulatory organization, for example,
could formulate the proposed communication in a number of ways,
depending on the nature of the transaction and the need to keep the
particular statement as concise as possible (e.g., for a simple stock
purchase, something like “based on the revised terms, we can offer
you the option to unwind this transaction within a year for 90% of
your investment at a price of $X”). Questions about the option could
then trigger additional disclosures and references to regulatory discussions of the meaning and limitations of the information being
communicated, in much the same way that sales representatives or
308
customer service representatives used automated scripts today.
306. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 81, at 22; Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human
Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 880 (1995) (“Similarly, a salesperson selling
something tempting but risky, such as options or commodities, will bring a marginally plausible set of reasons why the product is a smart, responsible choice, knowing
that investors wish to construct an explanation for the desired investment consistent
with their positive self-concept. . . . Investors and consumers want to think the warnings are meant for someone else, not them.” (internal citations omitted)).
307. For these purposes, a “material communication” would be any communication in which the terms of the proposed transaction are amended or modified in a
material way.
308. Martin C. Bryce, Jr. & Ballard Spahr, Credit Card Developments, 1590 PLI/CORP
259, 275–76 (2007) (describing suit filed by Minnesota Attorney General against
Capital One Bank and Capital One F.S.B. for use of customer service telephone
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Regulators would also need to launch a concerted investor education effort around the importance of understanding how such information could be used. At a minimum, regulators might caution investors to refrain from investing in a particular transaction, or
“nudge” them toward particular “plain vanilla” transactions, if they do
309
For the average investor, regulators
not understand the numbers.
could develop guidelines, similar to other consumer protection
guidelines, that discuss a spectrum of risk and illustrate how products
along such a risk spectrum may perform under different circumstances, similar to the format in which many brokerage websites provide key financial statistics and compare the performance of different
310
asset classes.
In particular, such rules of thumb can complement
credit ratings to provide both quantitative and qualitative information about the relative risk of securities.
D. Risk Management
Such a proposal is likely (as with any proposal that imposes fiduciary duties on financial services providers) to increase legal or operational risk. Firms may respond to the prospect of increased risk in a
number of ways, such as by making more conservative recommendations or limiting their recommendations to easily hedged products,
adopting enhanced hedging practices as part of managing their proprietary risk, or simply treating such increased risk as un-hedgeable
and thus increasing the likelihood of a firm default in the event of a
heightened incidence of rescission (whether through the exercise of
scripts in connection with marketing of credit cards); Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives,
1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 393, 443–44 (2005) (describing information-gathering scripts
used by customer service representatives in private credit-card dispute resolution).
309. One could argue that if the option is not comprehensible, the transaction is
unsuitable. See, e.g., Macey et al., supra note 20, at 815 (distinguishing transaction
suitability from product suitability). Alternatively, the safe harbor might not be available for certain retail accounts. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(4)(A)(i) (exception from
proportionate liability provisions governing federal securities law class actions for individuals “whose recoverable damages . . . are equal to more than 10 percent of [his]
net worth” or whose “net worth . . . is equal to less than $200,000”).
310. See, e.g., E*Trade Financial, Mutual Fund Screener, available at
https://www.etrade.wallst.com/v1/fundresearch/etfscreener/etf_screener.asp;
Fidelity.com, Mutual Fund Evaluator, http://screener.fidelity.com/ftgw/evaluator/
mf/goto/landing?ref_ro=0005; see also Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Release
No. 33-8998, 74 Fed. Reg. 4545, 4548 (Jan. 26, 2009) (adopting rules responding to
“address the length and complexity of mutual fund prospectuses by streamlining the
key information that is provided to investors, ensuring that access to the full wealth
of information about a fund is immediately and easily accessible, and providing the
means to present all information about a fund online in an interactive format that
facilitates comparisons of key information, such as expenses, across different funds
and different share classes of the same fund”).
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puts or lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty). Each of these options
would naturally impose serious costs on investors, whether in the
form of diminished investment opportunities or additional transaction costs; nevertheless, the proposal reduces the costs of compliance
and enforcement by establishing clear and auditable standards for
compliance.
To assess the impact of the proposal on firms, it is useful to consider first how the marketplace is likely to respond to a mandate that individual firms making investment recommendations offer downside
protection. The proposal enables financial services providers to more
accurately determine their legal risk when providing recommendations that otherwise would be subject to a fiduciary standard. It also
implicitly assumes that risks can be transferred to larger financial institutions that are better able to diversify them. For actively traded
products, the cost of protection can be determined ex ante from current market prices and passed on to the customer at the point of sale.
For products that trade in less liquid markets, in theory, firms unable
to bear the risk of rescission could purchase wholesale portfolio insurance from larger firms that engage in proprietary trading (whether account by account or on an omnibus basis).
As a practical matter, for most investment transactions, mechanisms would develop to manage the risk on a wholesale level. Clearing
firms that hold public customer accounts might offer portfolio protection to clients of introducing firms for securities transactions, since
311
they already manage credit risk. If any class of firms would be unable to meaningfully offset the risks of the proposal, it would likely be
underwriters of equity offerings, to the extent that they would likely
be required to assume any additional risk of rescission if their selling
group members breached a fiduciary standard when offering underwritten products; even here, however, the risk of liability for breach
312
of fiduciary duty could be limited to section 11 of the Securities Act.
To the extent that the proposal does impose a significant compliance cost—i.e., how do wholesale firms manage their exposure to
introducing or originating firms—the cost will therefore likely be
shifted to wholesalers. Regulators would seek to ensure that wholesalers have adequate internal controls in place to anticipate the extent
311. See generally Henry F. Minnerop, Clearing Arrangements, 58 BUS. LAW. 917, 929–
931 (2003) (describing clearing arrangements between introducing and clearing
brokers and the role of the clearing firm in managing credit risk). I do not intend,
of course, to suggest that clearing firms would, as a result of providing such services,
owe any fiduciary duty or otherwise be liable to customers of the introducing broker.
312. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
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of the risk to which their retail counterparties will expose them.
Wholesalers in turn will negotiate with specificity what products retailers will offer, the terms on which they will be offered, and so forth.
In sum, if efficient transfer of risk is permitted, the supervisory responsibilities that regulators have long sought to impose on clearing
firms and sponsors of special purpose vehicles will become enshrined
in arm’s-length contracts.
What then would the impact of the proposal be on the range of investment recommendations financial services providers are likely to
make? To the extent that wholesalers are responsible for managing
much of the risk of rescission, the short answer is likely to be “not
much.” Whereas independent investment advisers may well proceed
with greater caution in offering products (consistent with their existing fiduciary obligations), wholesalers will continue to rely on retail
broker-dealers and mortgage originators to push inventory, and as
discussed above, will likely need to provide some risk-management
capacity to their correspondents to keep the pipelines open.
E. Extensibility to Institutional Transactions
While the Dodd-Frank Act focuses on the fiduciary obligations
owed to retail investors, the principles that underlie the proposal
could be used to address the thorny question of suitability and institutional investors. One preliminary question that has vexed commentators is whether financial services providers owe any duty, derivative or otherwise, to investors in a professionally managed fund, such
313
as a mutual fund, hedge fund or private equity fund, on the theory
that the directors, general partners, or managing members of such
funds do not themselves have such advisory duties and may be dominated and controlled, or otherwise have a conflict of interest with the
financial services provider. The proposal in this article could handily
address that issue by simply passing through the same information
and exercise rights pro rata to individual fund investors. Because
many complex securities or derivative transactions already detail dis314
cussions over the pricing of downside protection, extending the
proposed option requirement would largely be superfluous.

313. Anita K. Krug, Address at the University of Washington School of Law Faculty
Colloquium: Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the Hedge Fund Problem (Feb. 24, 2011) (on file with author).
314. See, e.g., S. Lawrence Polk & Bryan M. Ward, A Guide to the “Regulatory No
Man’s Land” of Over-the-Counter Interest Rate Swaps, 124 BANKING L.J. 397, 401 (2007)
(discussing zero cost collars for interest-rate swaps).
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As discussed above, one of the principal difficulties that institutional investors face is that financial services providers successfully stave
off liability in private actions under Rule 10b-5 and in suits alleging
breach of state law fiduciary duty by challenging the justifiability of
315
reliance by sophisticated investors.
Courts, moreover, engage in a
qualitative, multifactor analysis to determine whether such liability is
316
warranted in light of the investor’s sophistication and yet treat the
317
absence of a right to rely as a complete defense to liability. In this
respect, an affirmative obligation to disclose a single rescission price
for a transaction or group of transactions, and allowing institutions to
litigate the accuracy of that price, might pierce through the morass of
considerations that have clouded liability in such suits without necessarily dramatically increasing the likelihood of liability.
If a financial services provider’s fiduciary duty required it to reveal
the price of providing downside protection for a particular transaction (or group of transactions), any subsequent judicial proceedings
would focus their inquiry on the accuracy of the information at the
time of the transaction. In such a system, courts could easily adopt a
presumption that investors are entitled to rely on the quoted price,
and that any material misstatement of the price would be deemed to
be the proximate cause of an investor’s decision not to modify the
terms of the transaction or seek a contemporaneous hedge against
downside risk. As discussed above, however, if a financial services
provider is able to establish, based on contemporaneous internal
records, that the price quoted did not materially deviate from the
price that would have been assigned to a particular transaction by its
own internal risk management systems, it would be entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on any claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty.
To the extent that institutional and other sophisticated investors
do not engage in isolated transactions, the fiduciary could be permitted to fulfill its duty by offering periodic quotations on a portfoliowide basis, rather than quotations in connection with individual
transactions. The result would be a continuous stream of information from the financial services provider to its clients about the risks
inherent in their portfolio, based on the firm’s own internal valuation

315. See supra notes 152–154.
316. See supra note 153.
317. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1028
(4th Cir. 1997) (“A plaintiff’s failure to prove that it justifiably relied on a broker's
alleged omission or misstatement is necessarily fatal to a securities fraud claim.”).
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models. Firms, of course, might object that this framework would
empower clients to “reverse engineer” their proprietary valuation
models and thus expose firms to the risk of adverse selection when
entering into transactions with clients; however, any system of fiduciary duties for institutional investors could be designed to curtail this
risk by periodically tweaking internal controls and negotiating with
regulators for individualized relief.
CONCLUSION
Extending fiduciary duties to retail investment transactions is a
laudable sentiment that is likely to encounter significant obstacles to
implementation. But regulators and industry representatives should
strive to identify the essence of the goals that proponents of such duties seek to achieve and to find ways to implement the resulting principles in a manner that improves not only the quality of recommendations that are made but also the nature of investment conversations
between firms and their clients across the entire spectrum of financial
services.

